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THROW THE BOOK AT THEM: WHY THE FTC NEEDS
TO GET TOUGHWITH INFLUENCERS
Christopher Terry,* Eliezer Joseph Silberberg ** & Stephen
Schmitz ***
The Federal Trade Commission is an administrative agency that has
traditionally been aggressive when deploying its delegated
authority. At the core of these actions is the FTC’s interpretive
definition of deception as based upon a reasonable consumer
standard. Specifically, the commission has regularly used Section
5(a) of the FTC Act, in tandem with its interpretive definition of
deception, as a sword in a variety of contexts, including enforcement
actions for deceptive advertising, endorsements, and claim
substantiation against a range of industries. These include
successfully brought actions or consent decrees obtained in
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enforcement proceedings against powerful economic entities,
including Google and Facebook. Yet, in one area, the FTC has been
reluctant to engage in the hard tactics it regularly deploys in other
areas. The Commission has struggled to employ a coherent
enforcement strategy for deceptive practices by Social Media
Influencers. The Commission has taken significant steps towards
deception and disclosure enforcement for influencers, including
publication of a set of guidelines for disclosure. However, with the
exception of a series of warning letters sent to high profile
influencers in April of 2017, the Commission has not engaged in a
significant enforcement action—choosing instead to launch an
inquiry in February 2020 to review the disclosure guidelines. As
empirical research demonstrates that consumers do not understand
the nature of the influencer process, this Article argues that the FTC
should employ a commitment to a robust enforcement stance. The
FTC’s failure to “make an example” of high-profile influencers or
to take a hardline approach with influencers, as the Commission did
with native advertising online, represents a parting with the manner
with which the Commissions has traditionally enforced the
deception standard in endorsement ads. This departure, this Article
argues, is undermining the FTC’s consumer protections.
INTRODUCTION
Social media influencers have become a pipeline for
merchandise branding, product sales promotion, and advertising
campaigns to persuade the masses across a range of platforms.1
Advertising campaigns driven through social media platforms are
inescapable, prefabricated, everyday events.2 Influencers are
1 Rochelle Bailis, The State of Influencer Marketing: 10 Influencer
Marketing Statistics to Inform Where You Invest, BIGCOMMERCE BLOG,
https://www.bigcommerce.com/blog/influencer-marketing-statistics/ (last visited
Jan. 22, 2021) (“When you want to really scale and when you want to reach new
audiences, you need content that makes people WANT you—and that comes from
having great content. One of the best ways to get this content is from influencers—
they know how to tell a story that fits the social media channel’s objective.”).
2 Brent Barnhart, What Is Viral Marketing (And Does It Actually Work in
2020), SPROUT BLOG (Jan. 16, 2021), https://sproutsocial.com/insights/viral-
marketing/.
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everywhere: on people’s timelines and in business strategy.3 To put
it mildly, influencer marketing is exploding,4 but the law has not
kept up.
Indeed, for nearly any hobby, practice, or field of entertainment,
there is a corresponding group of influencers whose content reaches
an interested audience. These influencers can have enormous reach
because of the sheer size of their follower base.5 For example, soccer
fans may not only have watched Cristiano Ronaldo, but they may be
one of his 148 million followers on Facebook.6 The same is true of
non-traditional sports stars like Turner “Tfue” Tenney who
commands 10.1 million followers on Twitch.tv,7 or Lee “Faker”
Sang-hyeok with nearly 2.8 million followers on Twitch.tv.8 Politics
is not immune to influencer culture either. For example, President
Barack Obama has more than 127million followers on Twitter.9 Pop
culture is filled with influencers like Kylie Jenner who has 219
million followers on Instagram, and her sister Kendall Jenner who
has 154 million on that platform.10 Even individuals who otherwise
3 20 Surprising Influencer Marketing Statistics, DIGIT.MKTG. INST. (Oct. 25,
2018), https://digitalmarketinginstitute.com/blog/20-influencer-marketing-
statistics-that-will-surprise-you (indicating that 60% of people have been
influenced by influencers before purchasing an item and that two-thirds of
marketers promote content via influencer marketing).
4 See id. (stating that “Influencer Marketing Has Surpassed Print
Marketing”).
5 Indeed, there are websites which track users who have the most followers
on different social media platforms. See, e.g., The Most Followed Accounts on
Twitter, BRANDWATCH, www.brandwatch.com%2Fblog%2Fmost-twitter-
followers%2F (last updated Jan. 9, 2021).
6 Cristiano Ronaldo (@Cristiano), FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com
/Cristiano/ (last visited Jan. 22, 2020). This is just his Facebook, and does not
include his other follower bases on other social media accounts.
7 Turner Tenney (Tfue), TWITCH, https://www.twitch.tv/tfue/ (last visited
Jan. 22, 2021).
8 Lee Sang-hyeok (Faker), TWITCH, https://www.twitch.tv/faker (last visited
Jan. 22, 2021).
9 Barack Obama (@BarackObama), TWITTER, https://twitter.com
/BarackObama (last visited Jan. 22, 2021).
10 Kylie Jenner (@KylieJenner), INSTAGRAM, https://www.instagram.com
/kyliejenner/ (last visited Jan. 22, 2021); Kendall Jenner (@KendallJenner),
INSTAGRAM, https://www.instagram.com/kendalljenner/ (last visited Jan. 22,
2020).
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lack traditional celebrity status can become social media
influencers, such as Addison Rae who has 77.6 million followers on
TikTok11 or Dude Perfect who has 55.4 million subscribers on
YouTube.12
Along with their pervasive presence, influencers have become
an integral part of marketing strategies. And influencers can charge
accordingly—a sponsored post from Dwayne ‘The Rock’ Johnson,
for example, is valued at just over $1,000,000.13 Kylie Jenner’s price
tag-per-post is also valued at about $1,000,000.14 Though other
influencers may charge less per post, the top ten richest influencers
on Instagram all make more than $700,000 per post.15 Even outside
of the payment-per-post realm, regular influencer activity can
generate significant profits. For example, “e-sports” influencer
Daequan “TSM_Daequan” Loco has been estimated to earn roughly
$750,000 a year from Twitch.tv subscriber fees alone, not counting
advertisement views or any other built-in tip jar features.16
The popularity of influencers does not end with their
followers—it extends to business as well. Influencer advertising
campaigns have changed dramatically over the past few years, but
the general view that influencer advertising is a successful brand-
11 Addison Rae (@addisonre), TIKTOK, https://www.tiktok.com
/@addisonre (last visited Jan. 22, 2021).
12 Dude Perfect, YOUTUBE, https://www.youtube.com/channel
/UCRijo3ddMTht_IHyNSNXpNQ (last visited Jan. 22, 2021).
13 The Rock Ranks as Instagram’s ‘Most Valuable Star’, BBCNEWS (July 2,
2020), https://www.bbc.com/news/business-53261043. Other similar high-
grossing influencers include household sports star names like Neymar da Silva
Santos Junior and popular culture icons such as Taylor Swift. Id.
14 Kaya Ismail, Social Media Influencers: Mega, Macro, Micro or Nano,
CMSWIRE (Dec. 10, 2018), https://www.cmswire.com/digital-marketing/social-
media-influencers-mega-macro-micro-or-nano/.
15 Id.; see also Instagram Rich List 2020, HOPPERHQ, https://
www.hopperhq.com/blog/instagram-rich-list/ (last visited Mar. 31, 2021) (listing
the cost per post of mega-influencers).
16 Julian, How Much Money Daequan Loco Makes on Twitch & Youtube—
Net Worth, NAIBUZZ, https://naibuzz.com/how-much-money-daequan-loco-
makes-on-twitch-youtube-net-worth/ (last updated Feb. 20, 2020).
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marketing strategy has not changed.17 Advertisers pay for influencer
endorsements because brands and the advertising industry recognize
that influencers wield an immense amount of power in the never-
ending battle to sell goods.18 With a potential return on investment
of $5.78 for every $1 spent by a brand, influencers have become an
integral part of the advertising industry.19 And there is no indication
that the deluge of posts, payments, and sales will slow down given
the success of influencers so far.20
In the face of the successes of influencer marketing, the FTC has
struggled to regulate influencer commercial speech and improve
influencer compliance with FTC Act requirements.21 At the close of
2020, the FTC has issued only one ruling against individual
influencers,22 supplementing its previous issuing of ninety
17 Taylor Lorenz, The Instagram Aesthetic Is Over, ATLANTIC (Apr. 23,
2019), https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2019/04/influencers-are-
abandoning-instagram-look/587803/.
18 Bailis, supra note 1.
19 See The State of Influencer Marketing 2020: Benchmark Report,
INFLUENCER MKTG. HUB, https://influencermarketinghub.com/influencer-
marketing-benchmark-report-2020/ (last updated Feb. 14, 2021) (noting
highlights of the continued growth of the influencer age—such as 80% of firms
surveyed using their marketing budget to pay influencers); cf. DIGIT.MKTG. INST.,
supra note 3 (indicating earnings of $6.50 per $1 spent on influencer advertising).
20 See Alexandra Mondalek, Are We in the Golden Age of the ‘Influencer
Brand’?, FASHIONISTA, https://fashionista.com/2020/02/influencer-fashion-
brands-market (last updated Feb. 18, 2020) (describing a fashion company’s—
known as Revolve—notoriety for pairing of influencers with metadata concerning
sales, turning individual influencers into household fashion names). But see Laura
DeMaude, Is the Golden Age of Social Media Influencers Gone for Good?,
JAMMY BEAR (Aug. 29, 2019), https://jammybear.com/is-the-golden-age-of-
social-media-influencers-gone-for-good/ (claiming that increased FTC attention
in 2019 would spell the end of the golden age of social media influencers). Given
the subject of this Article, it is fair to say that Mondalek had, perhaps, the better
prediction of the current zeitgeist.
21 See, e.g., Disclosures 101 for Social Media Influencers, FED. TRADE
COMM’N, https://www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/business-center/guidance/disclosures-
101-social-media-influencers (last visited Jan. 22, 2021).
22 See CSGOLotto, Inc., 164 F.T.C. 785 (2017); see also CSGO Lotto
Owners Settle FTC’s First-Ever Complaint Against Individual Social Media
Influencers, FED. TRADE COMM’N (Sept. 7, 2017), https://www.ftc.gov/news-
events/press-releases/2017/09/csgo-lotto-owners-settle-ftcs-first-ever-complaint-
against. The FTC does not seem to consider its action in Nudge LLC an action
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educational letters, and twenty-one follow-up letters to
influencers.23 But this strategy has failed to cause a shift in
influencer compliance. While the FTC has gone after a slew of
businesses, such as Devumi,24 Teami,25 and Machinima,26 this
strategy has not induced sufficient systematic change.27 For more
against an influencer, and so it is not described as an action against an influencer
in this Article. See generally Complaint, FTC v. Nudge, LLC, FTC File No. 182
3016, No. 2:19-CV-00867-RJS (D. Utah Nov. 5, 2019), available at https://
www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/cases/182_3016_nudge_complaint_redacte
d-public.pdf.
23 See FTC Staff Reminds Influencers and Brands to Clearly Disclose
Relationship, FED. TRADE COMM’N (Apr. 19, 2017), https://www.ftc.gov/news-
events/press-releases/2017/04/ftc-staff-reminds-influencers-brands-clearly-
disclose (informational letters); see also Mary K. Engle, Instagram Influencer
Warning Template, FED. TRADE COMM’N, https://www.ftc.gov/system/files
/attachments/press-releases/los-propietarios-de-csgo-lotto-resuelven-la-primera-
demanda-jamas-entablada-contra-influyentes-de/instagram_influencer_warning
_letter_template_9-6-17.pdf (last visited Jan. 22, 2021) (follow-up letters).
24 See generally FTC. v. Devumi, LLC, FTC File No. 182 3066, No. 9:19-
CV-81419-RKA (S.D. Fla. Oct. 18, 2019), available at https://www.ftc.gov
/system/files/documents/cases/devumi_complaint.pdf (complaint).
25 See generally FTC v. Teami, LLC, FTC File No. 182 3174, No. 8:20-CV-
518 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 6, 2020), available at https://www.ftc.gov/system/files
/documents/cases/complaint_4.pdf (complaint).
26 See generallyMachinima, Inc., 161 F.T.C. 318 (2016).
27 See Lara O’Reilly, ‘One of Many Stages of Maturity’: Ad Industry
Welcomes Instagram Influencer Marketing Labeling Changes, DIGIDAY (Oct. 19,
2020), https://digiday.com/marketing/one-of-many-stages-of-maturity-ad-
industry-welcomes-instagram-influencer-marketing-labeling-changes/
(describing Instagram’s “labelled” posts feature, a platform feature unveiled to
mark paid promotions and sponsored content). An important discussion in
O’Reilly’s article is the possible business repercussions of follower
disengagement and algorithm de-prioritization with posts with disclosed material
connections through post labelling. While companies may ostensibly be taking
precautions to improve disclosure, there appears to be anxiety over the
disadvantages of FTCA compliant disclosures. Id. This indicates that while
regulating businesses which engage in influencer advertising is an important piece
of the puzzle, it cannot be the only piece. Just as interestingly, other influencer
marketing firms believe that platforms are likely to be policed by regulation
agencies. Id. Recent FTC platform chasing indicates that this is an accurate belief.
See FTC Issues Orders to Nine Social Media and Video Streaming Services
Seeking Data About How They Collect, Use, and Present Information, FED.
TRADE COMM’N (Dec. 14, 2020), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-
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than a decade—or better understood, since the influencers-were-
usually-bloggers era28—the FTC has failed to take meaningful
action against influencers themselves.
The FTC’s failures to induce influencer’s compliance with FTC
endorsement regulations by enforcing against widespread
endorsement deception in a relatively new and popular marketplace,
through a relatively new and popular marketing strategy, tangibly
harms consumers. Empirical research strongly suggests that many
consumers do not understand the nature of the influencer process.29
As a result, consumers are tricked into buying products that they
think are being impartially endorsed by individual influencers who
are anything but impartial.30 In the face of an already nearly $10
billion dollar a year industry,31 the FTC has not been able to
effectively protect consumers from influencer non-compliance with
its regulations on endorsement disclosure.
The FTC’s ongoing refusal to take meaningful action against
influencers who fail to disclose the material connections between
themselves and the products they are promoting has created an
advertising mechanism engaged in systematic deception. This lack
of enforcement functionally undermines the agency’s wider
consumer protection authority—its efficacy and potency—under
Section 5 (as well as Section 13) of the FTC Act.32
releases/2020/12/ftc-issues-orders-nine-social-media-video-streaming-services.
The authors of this Article do not opine on whether platform chasing is a good or
bad option, as that is beyond the scope of this Article. Instead, we merely argue
that engendering influencer compliance will require actually enforcing against
influencers, and not just businesses. Another example of this can be seen by the
repeated influencer deception standard infractions between the FTC’s first
influencer enforcements and the most recent enforcements. See infra Part III.
28 See Jack Shafer, The FTC’s Mad Power Grab, SLATE: PRESS BOX (Oct. 7,
2009, 6:29 PM), https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2009/10/hey-blogger-the-
consumer-protection-police-would-like-a-word-with-you.html (discussing the
FTC’s increased scrutiny of blogger endorsements).
29 Lu Zhang, Pei-Jou Kuo &Michael McCall,Microcelebrity: The Impact of
Information Source, Hotel Type, and Misleading Photos on Consumers’
Responses, 60 CORNELL HOSP. Q. 285–97 (2019).
30 Id.
31 INFLUENCER MKTG. HUB, supra note 19, at 7.
32 15 U.S.C. §§ 45(a), 53(b).
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As the primary consumer protection administrative agency, the
FTC’s lack of action on influencers is not just unsustainable—it is
harmful to consumers. Influencers may be mouthpieces,33 but under
any traditional enforcement they should also be considered
endorsers who regularly engage in deceptive practices.34 A cursory
examination of most social media platforms can inundate a
consumer with a range of false and deceptive claims.35 With nothing
more than a “please stop, or we might say stop again” from the FTC,
influencers are operating in a world of unmatched freedom to
deceive consumers.
This Article argues that the FTC should deploy a commitment
to a strong, and when necessary, aggressive, enforcement stance on
influencer content—just as the agency does for other forms of
commercial speech. Such a strategy will require enforcement
against individual influencers, not just businesses and platforms.
The FTC’s failure to “make an example” of serial violating, high-
profile influencers36 is a departure from how the FTC has
33 In fact, to say that influencers are not part of sophisticated global networks
would be to ignore what the FTC has admitted it is up against since before 2016.
See Complaint ¶¶ 6–8, Machinima, Inc., 161 F.T.C. 318 (2016) (No. C-4569),
available at https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/cases
/150902machinima-cmpt.pdf (“Microsoft . . . embarked on a global advertising
campaign to promote the Xbox One and new Launch Titles . . . . Respondent
eventually entered into a written agreement . . . to provide advertising on behalf
of Microsoft as outlined in Respondent’s proposal.”). See generally Julie Muncy,
FTC Slaps Machinima on the Wrist for Its Paid Endorsements, WIRED (Sept. 2,
2015, 5:34 PM), https://www.wired.com/2015/09/ftc-machinima-microsoft-
youtube/ (describing one commentator’s immediate disdain for the FTC’s lack of
meaningful punishment against Machinima).
34 See Ari Lazarus, Is That Post #Sponsored?, FED. TRADE COMM’N (Apr.
19, 2017), https://www.consumer.ftc.gov/blog/2017/04/post-sponsored (showing
that commenters recognize that the FTC “talks a big talk” but has not taken
sufficient action).
35 Id.
36 Brittany Renner’s advertisements for Teami Teas through her Instagram
posts are just one example of an influencer’s repeated violations of FTC
disclosure requirements. Ms. Renner’s posts are far from the only example, but
unlike other disclosure violations, Renner’s violations have been used by the FTC
as part of its complaint exhibits and related press release. See TeaMarketer Misled
Consumers, Didn’t Adequately Disclose Payments to Well-Known Influencers,
FTC Alleges, FED. TRADE COMM’N (Mar. 6, 2020), https://www.ftc.gov/news-
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traditionally enforced the deception standard in endorsement
advertising.37 The FTC’s departure from its longstanding efforts to
police deception in advertising has undermined its consumer
protection authority and left consumers at the whims of influencers
producing deceptive online content that the FTC has routinely
challenged in other media in the past.
Part I of this Article discusses how influencers have become part
and parcel of the advertising industry and explores some social
science research about influencer content. Part II explores the FTC’s
Section 5(a) authority to enforce deceptive practices. Part III
explores the evolution of the FTC’s influencer enforcement case
line. Part IV reports a coded analysis of the comments submitted to
the FTC’s 2020 review of its endorsement guidelines, including the
responses to questions asked by the agency dealing with social
media influencer content. Part V proposes that the agency is
undermining its consumer enforcement duties and argues that the
incoming FTC must launch a policy of active enforcement against
the rampant deceptions in the commercial speech being produced by
influencers.
events/press-releases/2020/03/tea-marketer-misled-consumers-didnt-adequately-
disclose-payments; Exhibit 17C, FTC v. Teami, LLC, FTC File No. 182 3174,
No. 8:20-CV-518 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 5, 2020), available at https://www.ftc.gov
/system/files/documents/cases/1823174teamiexhibit17.c.mp4 (one of the
violative videos posted to Instagram by Brittany Renner in September 2018).
37 For example, the Commission has previously taken hardline approaches
against embedded online native advertising. Disclosures: How to Make Effective
Disclosures in Digital Advertising, FED. TRADE COMM’N (Mar. 2013),
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/attachments/press-releases/ftc-staff-
revises-online-advertising-disclosure-guidelines/130312dotcomdisclosures.pdf
[hereinafterHow to Make Effective Disclosures]. Commissioners in the FTC have
previously argued in favor of stronger regulation against general online deception,
though this has not necessarily been construed to apply to individual influencers.
Statement of Commissioner Rohit Chopra, FED. TRADE COMM’N (July 16, 2020),
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/1578231/social_
bots_chopra_statement.pdf (“We Cannot Trust Tech Platforms to Police This
Problem.”); see also Enforcement Policy Statement on Deceptively Formatted
Advertisements, FED. TRADE COMM’N 1–2 (Dec. 22, 2015), https://www.ftc.gov
/system/files/documents/public_statements/896923/151222deceptiveenforcemen
t.pdf [hereinafter Enforcement Policy Statement] (“The principle that advertising
and promotional messages should be identifiable as advertising is found in
Commission and staff policy guidance . . . .”).
THROW THE BOOK AT THEM 415
I. INFLUENCERS—A CONCISE HISTORY
A. Influencers, a New Walking Billboard
Social media influencers have become an integral part of the
larger media and advertising ecology.38 This is largely because of
their unique advertising abilities and mechanics.39 With internet
users becoming immune to traditional visual advertisements,
advertisers began to turn toward organic advertising techniques,
such as celebrity endorsements.40 These endorsements combine
word of mouth marketing with the mass appeal of a celebrity. While
streaming platforms like YouTube or Twitch.tv deliver large
quantities of influencer produced content, Instagram remains the
primary mechanism for the delivery of influencer-driven advertising
campaigns.41
Rather than discuss the types of content which appear in various
platforms, we propose that for regulatory purposes, an influencer
can be defined as an individual who has a material connection to
commercial products or services that are endorsed or promoted
through social media content to a group of followers. By this
definition, a social media influencer is a person who acts as a
perceived authority, who has a trusted voice that is perceived to be
neutral, and whose voice is functionally that of a paid
spokesperson.42
Influencers come in many sizes and are generally categorized
into four separate types: mega, macro, micro, and nano.43 Mega-
38 See, e.g., DIGIT. MKTG. INST., supra note 3.
39 Id.
40 Leah W. Feinman, Celebrity Endorsements in Non-Traditional
Advertising: How the FTC Regulations Fail to Keep Up with the Kardashians, 22
FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 97, 98–103 (2011).
41 See INFLUENCER MKTG. HUB, supra note 19 (“87% of respondents use
Instagram for influencer marketing . . . .”).
42 Laura E. Bladow, Worth the Click: Why Greater FTC Enforcement Is
Needed to Curtail Deceptive Practices in Influencer Marketing, 59 WM.&MARY
L. REV. 1123, 1128 (2018).
43 These different levels are not universally agreed upon, and the number of
followers required to reach each type is not universally agreed upon either.
Compare Ismail, supra note 14 (stating that nano is 1,000 or fewer followers),
with Bella Foxwell, A Guide to Social Media Influencers: Mega, Macro, Micro,
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level influencers have at least a million followers and are often
celebrities or public figures outside of social media.44 Mega-level
influencers are not always celebrities in the general sense—the
influencers may simply be highly followed individuals without any
other celebrity status.45 Macro-level influencers are typically
executives or writers/bloggers in an area. Macro-level influencers
have a large base of followers and their opinions are often important
to followers within the topical area they are associated with. Micro-
level influencers are everyday consumers producing social media
content for between one and ten thousand followers. Micro-level
influencers are highly sought after by advertisers; these influencers
are thought to generate the highest level o’f brand relevance because
their statements seem largely organic.46 Nano-level influencers
round out the influencer categories and have the smallest following
base at one thousand or fewer followers.47
Influence can be quantitatively assessed by one’s ability to
influence others and, conversely, how susceptible an audience is to
external influence.48 Marketers utilizing the services of social media
influencers have recognized that while both assessments of
influence are important, the latter element is key. An audience’s
ability to be influenced flows from its perception of the “mimic-
ability” of an influencer’s images—or whether the audience deems
the images eminently attainable.49 The mimic-ability of an
and Nano, ICONOSQUARE, https://blog.iconosquare.com/guide-to-social-media-
influencers/ (last updated Feb. 17, 2020) (stating that nano is 10,000 or fewer
followers).
44 See Ismail, supra note 14 (“Mega-influencers are the highest-ranking
category of social media influencer, they typically have more than a million
followers.”).
45 Lorenz, supra note 17.
46 See Ismail, supra note 14.
47 Gregory A. Nylen, Social Media Influencers as Endorsers: Pitfalls and
Best Practices to Avoid the Ire of the FTC, LAWYERS’ MUT. 31, 37 (Apr. 2020),
http://www.virtualonlineeditions.com/publication/?m=15276&i=655845&p=38;
see also Ismail, supra note 14.
48 Duncan J. Watts & Peter Sheridan Dodd, Influentials, Networks, and
Public Opinions Formation, 34 J. CONSUMER RSCH. 441, 441–43, (2007).
49 Chung-Wha Ki & Youn-Kyung Kim, The Mechanism by Which Social
Media Influencers Persuade Consumers: The Role of Consumers’ Desire to
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influencer also plays into the audience’s desire, for any number of
rational and irrational reasons, to mimic influencers and their
lifestyles.50 The end result is that deploying influencers who come
off as believable, credible, and mimicable to promote products has
become a key strategy for businesses looking to achieve a better
bottom line.51
There are currently no signs that the marketing industry is
seriously rethinking influencer use.52 There is little question that the
marketing industry believes that influencer advertising is an
effective tactic, with over 90% of marketers believing that
influencer marketing produces return-on-investment is comparable
to, or greater than, other marketing methods.53 In fact, advertising
and public relations professionals indicate the hardest part in using
influencers is identifying which influencers to use, rather than
Mimic, 36 PSYCH. & MKTG. 905, 905 (2019), available at https://onlinelibrary
.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1002/mar.21244.
50 Chung-Wha Ki, The Drivers and Impacts of Social Media Influencers: The
Role of Mimicry, TRACE: TENN. RSCH. AND CREATIVE EXCH., UNIV. TENN. 26–
27 (2018), https://trace.tennessee.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=6611&contex
t=utk_graddiss (“Compliance means conformity, and it refers to the act of
adapting to others’ wishes, to a rule, or to necessity. In other words, compliance
is a submissive response made in reaction to others’ request or influence appeals.
An influencer can encourage a target’s compliance desire by using her power
resources that link the influencer’s desired behavior to something that is of value
to the target.” (citations omitted)).
51 See, e.g., 10 Lessons from Instagram Influencers, SPROUTSOCIAL, https://
sproutsocial.com/insights/guides/instagram-influencers/ (last visited Jan. 22,
2020) (discussing the importance of “Sell[ing] Lifestyle, Not Product” as the
method of improving consumer engagement). In fact, the article speaks to the
success of simple photos and “longform” captions, which detail stories that are
thought provoking contextualized by photos of lifestyles that appear to be entirely
attainable. Id.
52 While there is some indication of the “maturation” of the industry, there is
no indication that the advertising business has seriously rethought how it uses
interns. See INFLUENCER MKTG. HUB, supra note 19 (“Influencer fraud is still of
concern to respondents, but less so than in the past.”).
53 Bailis, supra note 1. See also Ying Lin, 10 Influencer Marketing Statistics
You Need to Know in 2021 [Infographic], OBERLO (Mar. 31, 2020), https://
www.oberlo.com/blog/influencer-marketing-statistics (“93% of marketers use
influencer marketing.”).
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whether or not to use them.54 So far, economic analysis of influencer
marketing campaigns shows the usage of influencers is justified.55
B. Trust, the Fuel of Influencers
Unironically, in a regulatory regime based around the legal
concept of deception, trust remains an important component of the
success of social media influencers. Influencers who generate a
following also generate trust from their followers.56 Research has
demonstrated a positive relationship between influencer disclosure,
follower trust, and follower interest in the purchase of products
promoted through a properly disclosed social media post.57 The
results of another study indicated that endorsements yielded more
positive attitude when recommended by micro-level influencers;
even when study participants were shown misleading photos, a
higher level of trust of the endorsement from a micro-level
influencer remained.58 The advertising industry has quickly
observed that this trust between influencer and follower is ripe for
exploitation. Sadly, one study indicated that three-in-ten influencers
54 SeeDIGIT.MKTG. INST., supra note 3 (stating that major brands expect “an
increase in spend, with some 67% of marketers planning to increase their budgets
in the next 12 months, particularly on Instagram”). Furthermore while “73% of
marketers have a budget set aside for influencer marketing, . . . 67% are actively
engaging with and have a relationship with influencers.” Id.
55 See 80 Influencer Marketing Statistics for 2020, INFLUENCERMKTG. HUB,
https://influencermarketinghub.com/influencer-marketing-statistics/ (last updated
Jun. 15, 2020) (indicating that businesses have a $5.20 return-on-investment for
every $1 spent on influencer marketing). The top 13% of firms make $20 return-
on-investment for every $1. However, some firms generate little to no return on
investment. Id.
56 See Ki & Kim, supra note 49, at 910 (“Peer consumers today view [social
media influencers] as trusted sources of information . . . because they provide
information not only about a product/service’s features or quality, but also
reviews that detail their personal experiences using it.”).
57 See The 2017 State of the Creator Economy Study, IZEA 72, 85 (2017),
http://content.izea.com/hubfs/Gated_Content/2017%20State%20of%20the%20C
reator%20Economy%20(SOCE).pdf (indicating the interrelationship between
disclosure and trust).
58 Zhang, Kuo & McCall, supra note 29, at 285–97.
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have been asked to hide sponsorship disclosure.59 This may not be
malicious, but instead the result of a marketing firm’s inability to
understand the FTC’s guidelines—while two-thirds of marketers are
aware of FTC guidelines, only 11% of marketers claim to
understand them.60 This combination of trust and deception—
despite decreasing over the past year—continues to victimize
consumers, with one survey indicating that 38% of consumers
experience influencer fraud.61
Whether or not the industry is pushing for non-disclosure,62
some have argued that the FTC failed at supporting the disclosure
guidelines it has provided, suggesting in part that social media
influencers are not educated enough to engage in proper
disclosure.63 One assessment has argued that more training and
information is needed, and pointed at results indicating that of 70%
of influencers that had attempted to disclose their material
relationship, only 25% successfully complied with the
59 Christina Sauerborn, Note,Making the FTC☺: An Approach to Material
Connections Disclosures in the Emoji Age, 28 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP.MEDIA&
ENT. L.J. 571, 575 (2018) (“While influencers seem to have a better grasp on
disclosure requirements . . . three-in-ten influencers reported having been asked
by a client or marketer to hide the sponsored nature of their post.”).
60 IZEA, supra note 57, at 47.
61 See INFLUENCER MKTG. HUB, supra note 19 (indicating a drop from 68%
to 38% consumer fraud rate due to influencers). While this drop is both substantial
and heartening, it still leaves nearly four in ten consumers at risk, which is hardly
cause for celebration. See Zhang supra note 29, at 285–97 (providing similar
statistics regarding influencer fraud at a similar rate).
62 Alice Audrezet & Karine Charry, Do Influencers Need to Tell Audiences
They’re Getting Paid?, HARV. BUS. R. (Aug. 29, 2019), https://hbr.org/2019/08
/do-influencers-need-to-tell-audiences-theyre-getting-paid (“We find that in any
particular year, disclosure makes almost no difference to the impact of the
influencer’s recommendation on the purchase decision.”). It should be noted that
at least one study has indicated that disclosure does not negatively impact trust
rates among influencer follower bases. For example, Audrezet and Charry argue
that their surveys indicate that disclosure may improve trust among follower
bases, and therefore companies and influencers do not help their bottom-line by
refusing to disclose. Id.
63 Arunesh Mathur, Arvind Narayanan, & Marshini Chetty, Endorsements
on Social Media: An Empirical Study of Affiliate Marketing Disclosures on
YouTube and Pinterest, 2 PROC. OF THE ACM ON HUMAN-COMPUTER
INTERACTION (2018).
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requirements.64 Additionally, one showed that influencers did not
like the suggestion that the minimal language of “ad” be included as
a visible disclosure in a post.65
In comparison, native advertising—a type of online advertising
the FTC has been quite serious about regulating—now requires a
disclosure that is clear and prominent, despite similar concerns
about appearance.66 And the comparison between native advertising
online and social media influencer content is not an empty one.
Native advertising is hidden or embedded on websites, while
influencers who do not comply are functionally hiding sponsored
content on their personal pages.
There is substantial evidence that influencers are not following
or complying with the FTC’s disclosure requirements. In one
assessment of disclosures, only about 10% of affiliate marketing
content contained any disclosures at all, with even less meeting the
guidelines.67 Another assessment suggested that influencers were
improving, moving from 11% compliance in 2018 to 14%
compliance in 2019.68 Overall, these findings indicate that the
FTC’s attempts thus far69 to curb influencer non-compliance have
been unsuccessful.
II. THE FTC’S DECEPTION STANDARD
The FTC is granted the ability to regulate commerce by
preventing unfair or deceptive trade practices which harm
64 Vanessa Chan, When #Ad Is #Bad: Why the FTC Must Reform Its
Enforcement of Disclosure Policy in the Digital Age, 13 OHIO ST. BUS. L.J. 303,
321 (2019).
65 Amy R. Mudge, Native Advertising, Influencers, and Endorsements:
Where Is the Line Between Integrated Content and Deceptively Formatted
Advertising?, ANTITRUSTMAGAZINE 80, 83 (2017).
66 See Native Advertising: A Guide for Businesses, FED. TRADE COMM’N
(Dec. 2015), https://www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/business-center/guidance/native-
advertising-guide-businesses (“Any clarifying information necessary to prevent
deception must be disclosed clearly and prominently to overcome any misleading
impression.”).
67 Mathur et al., supra note 63.
68 INFLUENCER MKTG. HUB, supra note 19.
69 See, e.g., FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 21 (explaining FTC authority
and disclosure requirements in a consumer-friendly booklet format).
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consumers under Section 5(a) of the Federal Trade Commission Act
(“FTCA”).70 Under the language of Section 5, the FTC applies a
broadly written, flexibly applied deception standard when reviewing
the material claims of advertising. While an extended discussion of
deception is outside of the scope of this Article,71 the FTC has stated
that it will find a breach of the deception standard, as outlined in its
1983 policy paper, “if there is a misrepresentation, omission, or
other practice, that misleads the consumer acting reasonably in the
circumstances, to the consumer’s detriment.”72
This standard has never required actual injury, however. Instead,
only the possibility of deception is required. Under this standard an
actor need not actually deceive anyone. Injury instead comes from
the possibility of deceiving through acts or practices. The FTC has
never ruled that any particular percentage of consumers being
deceived definitively indicates that a practice is deceptive. However,
the FTC has publicly reaffirmed that a deception rate of 15% is
sufficient to demonstrate deception in cases of deceptive
advertising.73
This somewhat confusing standard—a quasi-objective, but
realistically, a subjective standard—was in need of clarification as
applied to endorsements. This came in the form of the Endorsement
Guides, first promulgated in 1980.74 While not carrying the force of
70 15 U.S.C. § 45.
71 See generally Jack E. Karns, The Federal Trade Commission’s Evolving
Deception Standard, 22 U. RICH. L. REV. 389 (1988); Cliffdale Assoc., Inc., 103
F.T.C. 110 (1984).
72 FTC Policy Statement on Deception, FED. TRADE COMM’N (Oct. 14,
1983), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/410531
/831014deceptionstmt.pdf.
73 See Sarah Sluis, FTC: Publishers Will Be Held Responsible for Misleading
Native Ads, ADEXCHANGER (June 3, 2015, 3:15 PM), https://
www.adexchanger.com/publishers/ftc-publishers-will-be-held-responsible-for-
misleading-native-ads/ (“‘An ad is deceptive if it misleads a significant
percentage of consumers . . . . [Engle] clarified that usually means 15% of
consumers, and sometimes as few as 10% of consumers.”). The origin of this
percentage is likely Firestone. See Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Fed. Trade.
Comm’n, 481 F.2d 246, 249 (6th Cir. 1973) (“We find it hard to overturn the
deception findings of the Commission if the ad thus misled 15% (or 10%) of the
buying public.”).
74 16 C.F.R. § 255.0 (2021).
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law, the Enforcement Guides clarify how the FTC enforces the
deception standard.75 The initial purpose of the Endorsement Guides
was to give guidance to the advertising industry about how to handle
celebrity endorsements.76 These celebrity endorsements often took
the form of appearing in an ad for a company or mentioning a
product on air.77
Initially in the 2000s, bloggers were the social media advertising
issue.78 Sponsored blog posts appear among the other unsponsored
content from a particular blogger and may look and read like their
own posts.79 While previously celebrities would appear on behalf of
a company, the introduction of blogger endorsements wove
advertisements into an otherwise impartial-seeming personal feed of
media. Additionally, it was not clear if the endorsers would even be
liable for the statements made at the request of an advertising
agency.80 Without clear liability, blog posts could be solicited word-
of-mouth advertisements that appeared as otherwise
indistinguishable from other impartial posts. These features, and
others, compelled the FTC to update the Endorsement Guides in
200981—nearly three decades after first promulgation—to address
the new age (and now ancient methods) of internet-based
advertising.
In the FTC’s own words, the Guides were meant to enforce the
law so that consumers could trust what they see in social media:
“Moreover, to the extent that consumers’ willingness to trust social
media depends on the ability of those media to retain their credibility
as reliable sources of information, application of the general
principles embodied in the Guides presumably would have a
75 See, e.g., State v. Amoco Oil Co., 293 N.W.2d 487, 495–96 (Wis. 1980).
76 Feinman, supra note 40, at 121.
77 Id. at 105–10.
78 See How to Make Effective Disclosures, supra note 37, at 4 n.10 (“[W]hen
the Endorsement Guides were reviewed in 2009, examples involving blogs were
included, to make clear that the FTC Act applies to this then-new form of social
media marketing.”).
79 Chan, supra note 64, at 314–15.
80 Guides Concerning the Use of Endorsements and Testimonials in
Advertising, 74 Fed. Reg. 53,123, 52,129 (Oct. 15, 2009) (codified at 16 C.F.R. §
255 (2021)).
81 Chan, supra note 64, at 316.
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beneficial, not detrimental, effect.”82 In fact, the promulgation of the
updated Guides in 2009 specifically stated that industry self-
regulation would be insufficient to maintain trust in the virtual
marketplace: “[A]lthough industry self-regulation certainly can play
an important role in protecting consumers as these new forms of
marketing continue to evolve and new ones are developed, self-
regulation works best when it is backed up by a strong law
enforcement presence.”83
The nitty-gritty of the Enforcement Guides is critical to
understanding the make-up of influencer enforcement opportunities.
According to the Guides, an endorser is “[t]he party whose opinions,
beliefs, findings, or experience the message appears to reflect . . .
and may be an individual, group, or institution.”84 For the purpose
of the Guides, endorsers are a broad category. And this choice makes
sense, since as the examples show, modern commercial media can
take a variety of forms, formats, voices, and speakers.85
The endorsement standard, codified in the Endorsement Guides,
defines “endorsement” broadly to mean “any advertising
message.”86 The Guides indicated that breadth in expounding on
what constitutes “advertising,” including “verbal statements,
demonstrations, or depictions of the name, signature, likeness or
other identifying personal characteristics of an individual or the
name or seal of an organization.”87
An endorsement doesn’t have to mean that a statement was
actually intended as an endorsement by the endorser.88
Formalistically understood, to be treated as an endorsement, one
must merely make a statement “that consumers are likely to believe
reflects the opinions, beliefs, findings, or experiences of a party
other than the sponsoring advertiser.”89 Under this standard, the
statement merely needs to be one that a consumer, acting as a
82 Guides Concerning the use of Endorsements and Testimonials in
Advertising, 74 Fed. Reg. at 53,126.
83 Id.
84 16 C.F.R. § 255.0(b) (2021).
85 Id. exs. (a)–(f).
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reasonable consumer in the circumstances—would likely believe is
an endorsement.90 In response to public comment about the
supposed uncertainty this would cause, the FTC stated outright that
the Guides “focus[] on the message consumers take from the speech
at issue.”91
The extent to which this applies in the contemporary influencer
world is somewhat unsettled. In the Federal Register responses, the
FTC suggested some hesitation attaching this standard to anyone
making a positive statement about a brand or product.92 The FTC
instead stated it would opt to utilize what is an apparently
unincorporated test concerning whether the speaker is: “(1) acting
solely independently, in which case there is no endorsement, or (2)
acting on behalf of the advertiser or its agent, such that the speaker’s
statement is an ‘endorsement’ that is part of an overall marketing
campaign.”93 Though this Article does not discuss this issue at
length—as the influencers and influencing being discussed here are
nearly universally part of some compensation scheme—this test
does not seem as intuitive as perhaps the FTC originally believed.
This is especially the case because the Guides indicate that the
endorsement definition includes endorsements honestly believed by
the endorser that “are identical to those of the sponsoring
advertiser.”94 Muddying these waters even more, the endorsement
standard treats testimonial statements as identical to endorsements.95
More straightforwardly, endorsements have some basic
substantive requirements. They must not be lies; that is,
“[e]ndorsements must reflect the honest opinions, findings, beliefs,
or experience of the endorser.”96 This sets the bar high for
endorsement deception. Statements that even distort the truth are
considered deceptive under this standard.97 In effect, this means that
90 Id.
91 Guides Concerning the Use of Endorsements and Testimonials in
Advertising, 74 Fed. Reg. 53,123, 52,125 (Oct. 15, 2009) (codified at 16 C.F.R. §
255 (2021)).
92 Id. at 53,126.
93 Id.
94 16 C.F.R. § 255.0(b) (2021).
95 Id. § 255.0(c).
96 Id. § 255.1(a).
97 Id. § 255.1(b).
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individuals stating something they believe in order to sell a product,
even if they are not intending to make an endorsement, must be
telling their subjective truth. If they are touting an experience with
that product, then the experience being told must reflect that
subjective truth as well.98 As this Article will indicate, this is at odds
with the history of endorsements, endorsement enforcements, and
the magical world of influencers.99
But more than just telling their subjective truth, endorsers cannot
say anything that is not objectively true from the brand’s standpoint
either. Endorsements by an endorser about a product are deceptive
just as they would be deceptive had they been made by the business
or manufacturer.100 Constrained between telling their own
subjective truth and the brand’s objective truth, the Enforcement
Guides’ manifest intent is to ensure that consumers are fed only
honest opinions.
The FTC’s intent in clarifying the duty to be truthful in
endorsements is evident in the Federal Register comments. These
comments indicate that failure to be truthful by the terms set by the
Enforcement Guides would meet with penalties for both the
company and the endorser.101 While the FTC’s 1980 Enforcement
Guides were ambiguous on this matter, the 2009 Enforcement
Guides contained language the FTC affirmatively stated was
intended to put endorsers on notice of this liability.102 The FTC’s
98 Id.
99 See discussion infra Part III.
100 16 C.F.R. § 255.1(a) (2021).
101 See Guides Concerning the Use of Endorsements and Testimonials in
Advertising, 74 Fed. Reg. 53,123, 53,127 (Oct. 15, 2009) (codified at 16 C.F.R. §
255 (2021)). (“The Commission is revising new Example 5, however, to clarify
that both the advertiser and the blogger are subject to liability for misleading or
unsubstantiated representations made in the course of the blogger’s
endorsement.”).
102 Id. at 53,127–28 (“The 1980 Guides did not explicitly state that endorsers,
as well as advertisers, could be liable under the FTC Act for statements they make
in an endorsement. To make that potential liability more apparent to those who
might be considering making an endorsement (and to those counseling
prospective endorsers), the Commission’s proposed revised Guides included new
language in Section 255.1(d) stating that ‘Endorsers . . . may be liable for
statements made in the course of their endorsements.’ The Commission’s proposal
also included several new examples featuring celebrities and experts.”).
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language in Section 255.1(d) makes clear this intent:
“Endorsers . . . may be liable for statements made in the course of
their endorsements.”103 Furthermore, the FTC did not view this as
putting celebrity endorsers through any form of excessive scrutiny
for their statements. Instead, the FTC explained that “th[e] new
provision merely ‘explicitly recognizes two principles that the
Commission’s law enforcement activities have already made clear,’
one of which is ‘that endorsers may also be subject to liability for
their statements.’”104
The FTC’s hardball verbiage did not end there. It explicitly
stated that “[a]n advertisement employing endorsements by one or
more consumers about the performance of an advertised product or
service will be interpreted as representing that the product or service
is effective for the purpose depicted in the advertisement.”105 By this
view the FTC stated that when a consumer endorsement is made, the
brand must be able to substantiate the claim made.106 Furthermore,
the FTC takes the statement on its face: if the endorser makes a
statement and a consumer acting reasonably in the circumstances
could believe that the statement is likely to be true, then the product
must live up to that standard.107
Furthermore, the FTC requires parties (persons, partnerships, or
corporations) to disclose “material connections” “clearly and
conspicuously.”108 “Material connections” means any relationships
that would impact the weight or credibility that the audience gives
the endorsement. Disclosures must also be clear—i.e., the audience
must be able to easily read the disclosure.109 This standard applies
to claims made by endorsers ranging from consumers to celebrities
to experts and expert agencies.110 In today’s climate of online
103 16 C.F.R. § 255.1(d) (2021).
104 Guides Concerning the Use of Endorsements and Testimonials in
Advertising, 74 Fed. Reg. at 53,128.
105 16 C.F.R. § 255.2(a) (2021).
106 Id. § 255.2(b).
107 Enforcement Policy Statement, supra note 37, at 1.
108 Veronica N. Ramirez, Note, Fashion Statements Turned Endorsements:
How FTC Enforcement Could Cripple the Internet’s Trendsetter, 68 SYRACUSE
L. REV. 483, 486 (2018).
109 See id. at 487 n.19.
110 See generally 16 C.F.R. §§ 255.1–4 (2021).
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endorsement, the FTC specifically intended to target endorsers as
the ones likely needing to disclose—as opposed to brands—because
of the fluidity and ease of online publication of endorsements.111
While disclosure by endorsers takes on a heightened level of
importance, following from the FTC’s dual liability view of
endorsement liability attaching to both sponsors and endorsers, the
Enforcement Guides were also intended to ensure that marketers
take care to ensure “full disclosure” by their endorsers.112
Non-disclosure of material connections is not always deceptive.
Omissions are deceptive when: (1) the “information necessary to
prevent a reasonable expectation or belief from being misleading is
not disclosed,” and (2) “consumers are likely to have chosen
differently but for the deception.”113 Unfortunately, because of the
difficulty in assessing just what a reasonable individual might think,
the FTC has given seemingly conflicting examples of how it intends
to enforce the rules in the Enforcement Guides.
III. FTC ENFORCEMENT ON INFLUENCE AND INFLUENCERS—A
CONCISE HISTORY
A. Lunada and the Blog Baseline: Influencers as Bloggers
Posting Opinions
In FTC v. Lunada Biomedical, Inc., the FTC brought an
enforcement action against a drug company that sold “Amberen,”
which was purported to cause weight loss among pre-menopausal
111 See Guides Concerning the Use of Endorsements and Testimonials in
Advertising, 74 Fed. Reg. 53,123, 53,134 (Oct. 15, 2009) (codified at 16 C.F.R. §
255 (2021)). (“The recent creation of consumer-generated media means that in
many instances, endorsements are now disseminated by the endorser, rather than
by the sponsoring advertiser. In these contexts, the Commission believes that the
endorser is the party primarily responsible for disclosing material connections
with the advertiser.”).
112 See 16 C.F.R. § 255.5 (2021) (codifying necessity for full disclosure). See
also Guides Concerning the Use of Endorsements and Testimonials in
Advertising, 74 Fed. Reg. at 52,134 (“[M]arketers should effectively monitor
disclosure of their word-of-mouth advocates.”); 16 C.F.R. § 255.1(d) (2021)
(codifying dual liability view of endorsement).
113 FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 72.
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and menopausal women.114 In order to advertise Amberen, Lunada
entered into an agreement with International Marketing Company
(“IMC”), in which Lunada agreed to pay IMC $2,000 per month as
well as daily and hourly fees.115 That agreement included a
provision in which IMC would operate a blog featuring Amberen.116
Pursuant to the agreement, in December 2009 IMC began operating
“Ask Carol: A Menopause Blog” (“Carol’s Blog”).117 Carol’s
Blog’s posts were actually based upon IMC’s president’s own
experiences with menopause.118 That blog endorsed Amberen as a
product that “provided relief for her menopause symptoms,
including weight gain, hot flashes, irritability, and sleeplessness.”119
Carol’s Blog even included IMC’s president’s background as a
nurse, promoted Amberen as a “safe alternative” to hormone
replacement therapy, and even included a toll-free number to
procure Amberen.120
No disclosure of the material connection between the blog, its
writer, and the drug manufacturer were provided.121 In its stipulated
order for permanent injunction, the court enjoined Lunada from
future prohibited representations regarding drug benefits and
required disclosure of material connections between Lunada and its
endorsers.122
Lunada presents modern deceptive influencing under the guise
of the old issue of blogging. Carol’s Blog masqueraded as a blog,
but actually was more akin to contemporary influencer advertising
114 Complaint at 2, FTC v. Lunada Biomedical, Inc., FTC File No. 132 3067,
No. CV-15-3380-MWF (PLA) (C.D. Cal. May 12, 2015), available at https://
www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/cases/150506lunadacmpt_0.pdf.
115 Id. at 5.
116 Id. at 5–6.
117 Id. at 5.
118 Id.
119 Id. at 6.
120 Id.
121 Id. at 18, 22; see generally id. at 56–57.
122 Stipulated Order at 6, 10, FTC v. Lunada Biomedical, Inc., FTC File No.
132 3067, No. CV-15-3380-MWF (PLA) (C.D. Cal. May 25, 2016), available at
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/cases/160525lunadastip.pdf.
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campaigns.123 Carol’s Blog was professionally created to appeal to
and build rapport with a specific demographic through carefully
constructed personal stories while pushing native advertising.124
While Carol’s Blog does not aesthetically resemble influencer
deception,125 it did roughly the same thing—present advertising
material masked as personal opinions from a trustable source,
without proper disclosure, for monetary gain.
Lunada provides an indication of what content and which parties
the FTC previously felt comfortable enforcing against. Reasoning
from the blog-baseline—that only the company that benefits from
the disclosure violations should be enforced against—the FTC did
not enforce against IMC.126 Despite IMC being a professional
advertising agency127 and a sophisticated party, the FTC chose not
to do so. The FTC’s unstated, baseline assumption was that
businesses, and not individual bloggers, are engaged in deceit.
Lunada shows that this reasoning is largely inapplicable to
effectively regulating sophisticated influencer marketing.
B. Machinima: Enforce Against Companies, Make
Companies Police Influencers
In In re Machinima, Inc., the FTC brought an enforcement
action against Machinima,128 a video game video production
123 Complaint, supra note 114, at 56–57 (indicating the imagery of the blog).
This is not to say that one could view Lunada’s Carol’s Blog as akin to the blog
baseline because it is a blog. Even under that view, Carol’s Blog indicates what
the FTC was previously comfortable with and how the FTC has unsuccessfully
transitioned to enforcement against influencers.
124 Id. at 6.
125 Id. at 58–59.
126 See generally id. (lacking any enforcement against IMC); see also
Stipulated Order, supra note 122 (failing to mention IMC’s role in the press
release); Marketers of Dietary Supplement Amberen Settle FTC Charges
Regarding Misleading Weight-Loss and Menopause Relief Claims, FED. TRADE
COMM’N (May 20, 2016), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2016
/05/marketers-dietary-supplement-amberen-settle-ftc-charges-regarding.
127 Complaint, supra note 114, at 5.
128 Machinima, Inc., 161 F.T.C. 318 (2016).
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company.129 In 2013, Machinima approached Microsoft and its
advertising partner, Starcom, to market the Xbox One console and a
variety of the titles that would launch upon the Xbox One release.130
The plan to advertise the console contained two parts.131 In phase
one, five influencers under Machinima’s banner would each
produce two videos to talk positively about the Xbox One and the
launch games.132 The videos had no disclosures about the
compensation that the video-makers would receive.133 In phase two,
Machinima gave influencers $1 for every 1,000 views until
Machinima had paid out $25,000.134 In order to join the second
phase of the campaign, an influencer was required to sign a Video
Campaign agreement including requirements that each video
include thirty seconds of Xbox One and launch games in the first
two minutes of the video.135 It also required there to be no negative
content concerning Machinima, Xbox One, or the launch titles.
Influencers produced more than three hundred videos under phase-
two terms.136 In its Decision and Order, the FTC required, among
other things, that Machinima establish influencer disclosure
requirements as well as a system for monitoring influencer
activity.137
The takeaway from Machinima is two-fold. First, the FTC’s
baseline view of online deception as an issue of blogging, and not
influencers, shines through in Machinima. For example, even
though the Decision and Order used the term “influencer” in its
129 Tola Onanuga, The Collapse of Machinima Is a Stark Warning to
YouTube Creators, WIRED (Jan. 27, 2019), https://www.wired.co.uk/article
/machinima-youtube.
130 Complaint at 2, Machinima, 161 F.T.C. 318 (2016) (No. C-4569),
available at https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/cases/150902
machinima-cmpt.pdf.
131 Id. at 2–3.
132 Id. at 2.
133 Id. at 3.
134 Id.
135 Id. at 4.
136 Id.
137 Decision and Order at 3–5, Machinima, 161 F.T.C. 318 (No. C-4569),
available at https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/cases/160317
machinimado.pdf.
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consumer blog, the FTC still referred to the video game YouTubers
as “bloggers” in 2015.138 This could not have been farther from the
reality. In that same blog, the FTC acknowledged that Machinima,
a company, generated billions of views per month.139 But it did not
recognize that Machinima’s gaming content came from a collective
of individual gamer-YouTubers who each had their own followings
as part of a larger community within YouTube.140 The influencers
themselves were affiliated with Machinima and were already
popular figures within the Machinima community—they were not
wholly uninformed, unsophisticated parties. For example, one of the
“bloggers,” Tom Cassell,141 received $30,000 for videos receiving
730,000 views and 300,000 views, respectively.142 Yet the FTC
treated Machinima, the company, as solely the culprit and solely
responsible for enforcing and monitoring future disclosures.
Second, Machinima calls into question the efficacy of the view
of some commentators that influencers should be able to show their
own personal opinions without having to make a disclosure. It is
highly likely that the gamers that were called on to promote
Machinima, the Xbox One, and the slew of games were not going to
disparage some or any of the list in any case.143 Their position as
138 Alvaro Puig, FTC: Video Reviews of Xbox One Were Deceptive, FED.
TRADECOMM’N (Sept. 2, 2015), https://www.consumer.ftc.gov/blog/2015/09/ftc-
video-reviews-xbox-one-were-deceptive; see also FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra
note 22.
139 See Puig, supra note 138 (“Machinima, the operator of a popular
YouTube network with 3 billion monthly video views . . . .”).
140 Onanuga, supra note 129.
141 See generally Syndicate, YOUTUBE, https://www.youtube.com/user
/TheSyndicateProject (last visited Jan. 22, 2021).
142 Complaint, supra note 130, at 3.
143 In general, Machinima’s gaming content was not negative towards a
specific game. In fact, the channel contained content that praised games in an
informal and gaming community centered way. See, e.g., Archive: Call of Duty
XP 2011—Team Respawn Explores COD XP! Stark, Hutch, SeaNanners, Tejbz,
YOUTUBE (Kaminaji Apr. 11, 2019), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v
=Rd3u9IzYlh4 (giving an accurate depiction of a type of video that would have
been posted as part of the Machinima page as part of a community project).
Machinima had multiple sections of its video production, one of which was called
“Respawn” which featured gameplay from the Call of Duty game series, which
formed the foundation for some gaming influencers’, like Tom Cassell’s, careers.
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gamer-influencers within the Machinima community meant that the
gamers not enforced against were likely to buy an Xbox One and
play games built for the console as part of their standard influencer
fare.144 It is possible that the views described would have been the
personal views of the gamer-influencers had they not participated.
Nonetheless, that possibility is not the reality, and the origin of the
beliefs matters. The mere fact that the views expressed could have
actually been their views does not detract from the actual fact that
the gamers were engaged in an advertising campaign, they were paid
to do so, and the non-disclosure of these facts meant that those
gamers—not just Machinima—were deceiving their fanbase
(including minors).
C. Lord & Taylor: Machinima Redux
In In re Lord & Taylor, LLC, the FTC brought an enforcement
action against Lord & Taylor for its deceptive marketing of the
“Paisley Asymmetric Dress,” which was sold under its “Design
Lab” label.145 In that action, the FTC stated that Lord & Taylor had
developed plans to market its dress through a social media campaign
it called a “product bomb” that was launched in March of 2015.146
The FTC described the campaign as “comprised of Lord & Taylor-
branded blog posts, photos, video uploads, native advertising
editorials in online fashion magazines, and use of a team of fashion
influencers recruited for their fashion style and extensive base of
followers on social media platforms.”147 That campaign utilized
both influencer marketing as well as marketing through Nylon
See Machinima Respawn, YOUTUBE, https://www.youtube.com/user
/machinimarespawn (last visited Apr. 1, 2021).
144 See Blame Truth—the CODFather, What Happened to Machinima
Respawn? (Black Ops 3 Gameplay), YOUTUBE (June 30, 2016), https://
www.youtube.com/watch?v=9MI-LJ2cQFo; see also Tejbz, Modern Warfare 2
SeaNanners Dual Commentary—Team Deathmatch Afghan ACR, YOUTUBE (Jan.
16, 2010), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=p7mty67Teh0.
145 Complaint at 1, Lord & Taylor, LLC, FTC File No. 152 3181 (Mar. 15,
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Magazine.148 In making social media posts, Lord & Taylor “did not
require the influencers to disclose in their postings that the company
had compensated them, nor obligate the influencers to disclose that
they had been compensated.”149 The FTC imposed a twenty-year
order precluding, among other things, Lord & Taylor’s future failure
to adequately disclose material connections and affiliation with
influencers who make online misrepresentations.150 Once again, no
punishments were imposed on the influencers who participated in
the campaign.151
Lord & Taylor presents a scenario where the FTC’s Machinima
standard of business self-enforcement could have been viable.
Similar to Machinima, Lord & Taylor’s “product bomb” used
influencer marketing over social media to disseminate native
advertising.152 But Lord & Taylor was much more involved than
Machinima in its implementation of the “product bomb.”153 Lord &
Taylor coordinated gifting the dress to fifty “select fashion
influencers” and then paid those influencers between $1,000 and
$4,000 to post “one photo of themselves wearing the Design Labs
dress during a specified time frame” in March of 2015.154 While the
influencers were free to style the dress as they liked, “Lord &Taylor
contractually obligated them to exclusively mention the company
using the ‘@lordandtaylor’ Instagram user designation . . . .”155
Influencers were also required to use the campaign hashtag
148 See id. at 2 (discussing Nylon Magazine’s part in the marketing
campaign).
149 See id.
150 Decision and Order at 7, Lord & Taylor, LLC, FTC File No. 152 3181
(May 23, 2016), available at https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/cases
/160523lordtaylordo.pdf.
151 See generally id. (refusing to impose sanctions on the involved
influencers).
152 See Lesley Fair, FTC’s Lord & Taylor Case: In Native Advertising, Clear
Disclosure Is Always in Style, FED TRADE COMM’N (Mar. 15, 2016), https://
www.ftc.gov/news-events/blogs/business-blog/2016/03/ftcs-lord-taylor-case-
native-advertising-clear-disclosure (describing the marketing campaign as native
advertising).
153 See Complaint, supra note 145, at 2 (describing Lord & Taylor’s posting
requirements in contracts, including a pre-post oversight).
154 See id. at 2.
155 See id.
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“#DesignLab” in the caption as well as tag Lord & Taylor using its
user designation in the photo.156 Lord & Taylor even required pre-
approval of influencer posts.157
Without addressing whether the FTC should be allowed to order
disgorgement and restitution of funds, Machinima’s standard as
applied in Lord & Taylor amounts to a two-strike standard, where
one violation does little but require that a violator follow the law,
which was the requirement before the violation. Lord & Taylor
could have followed deception laws; it chose not to, and it was
rewarded with 11.4 million collective user views, 328,000 post
engagements with native advertising, and a sold-out product.158
Lord & Taylor’s punishment was an injunction on further violations,
with no monetary penalties assessed.159
D. Warner Bros. Home Entertainment: Machinima Blows
Up in the FTC’s Face.
In In re Warner Bros. Home Entertainment, Inc.,160 the FTC
pursued an enforcement action under Section 5(a) authority against
Warner Bros. Home Entertainment (“WBHE”) for its contract with
Plaid Social Labs LLC (“Plaid Social Labs”) to conduct a marketing
campaign centered around gaming influencers on YouTube.161 Plaid
Social Labs coordinated this campaign—appropriately called the
“YouTube Influencer Campaign”—which focused on promoting the
upcoming video game titleMiddle Earth: Shadow of Mordor.162 To
promote the game, Plaid Social Labs hired notable YouTube gaming
influencers to promote the game.163 Those YouTubers agreed to




159 See Letter to Sharp Mann, FED. TRADE COMM’N (May 20, 2016), https://
www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/cases/160523lordtaylorletters.pdf.
160 Warner Bros. Home Entm’t, Inc., 162 F.T.C. 1040 (2016).
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video “feature gameplay” of Shadow of Mordor, that they have a
“strong verbal call-to-action” to click a description box hyperlink to
the video game’s website, and that they make one Facebook post or
Tweet “in support of [their] video.”164 Importantly, the influencers
were to “promote positive sentiment” about the video game and
were not to promote “negative sentiment” about the game, the game
publisher, or affiliated businesses.165 In return, influencers received
free, pre-release access to the game, as well as hundreds to
thousands of dollars in payment for their video and social media
post.166 While Plaid Social Labs required that the influencers give a
disclaimer in the description box of their video, it was not
conspicuous—this was similarly true for the influencers’ related
social media post about the video. The campaign generated more
than 5.5 million views.167
There are two important takeaways from Warner Bros. First,
Plaid Social Labs was not enforced against.168 Though in a later
case, Inside Publications, a middle-man marketing firm was
enforced against for having been a material agent in creating the
deceptive influencer campaign, here Plaid Social Labs—having
taken on a seemingly identical role—was not enforced against at
all.169 This shows that FTC enforcement has taken at least one
(small) step forward in bringing enforcements against those
responsible for influencer deception since Warner Bros.170
Second, Warner Bros. puts the nail in the coffin for the
Machinima standard’s workability. While the influencers in this
campaign go largely unmentioned in the agency’s enforcement
action, the influencers in this case are not unsophisticated parties
and they were required by the terms of their agreement to include
164 Id. at 2.
165 Id.
166 Id.
167 Id. at 3.
168 See generally Decision and Order, Warner Bros., 162 F.T.C. 1040 (No.
C-4595), available at https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/cases/161811_
c-4595_warner_bros_do.pdf.
169 Id.
170 See Decision and Order, Inside Publications, LLC, FTC File No. 172
3067 (Jan. 31, 2019), available at https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents
/cases/c-4669_172_3067_inside_publications_decision_and_order_2-8-19.pdf.
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disclosures in their posts.171 In effect, not only were influencers not
enforced against for failing to conspicuously disclose, some
influencers were given a pass for their failure to even follow
disclosure requirements they had agreed to use.172 While the
influencers were subject to post pre-approval by WBHE or Plaid
Social Labs,173 the influencers selected were popular gaming
community figures with large bases of subscribers and followers.174
These individual gaming influencers were not unsophisticated
parties—they were seasoned professional video game
entertainers.175 Viewed with this background, it is odd that the FTC
felt at ease exclusively faulting Warner Bros. for the failure of
professional influencers to disclose their connections, even when a
group of those professional influencers failed to follow their
contract by including the full disclosure required by Plaid Social
Labs.
E. CSGOLotto: The FTC Gets It Right, but Only Kind Of
In In re CSGOLotto, Trevor Martin, and Thomas Cassell, the
only case where influencers themselves had an action brought
against them, Martin and Cassell owned CSGO Lotto, a gambling
171 See Complaint, supra note 161, at 2–3.
172 Id. at 3.
173 Id.
174 For example, the exhibits indicate that the influencers chosen included
PewDiePie and SivHD, among others, both of which had significant follower
bases at the time and could generate hundreds of thousands to millions of video
views. See Exhibits A1–D2, Warner Bros., 162 F.T.C. 1040 (No. C-4595),
available at https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/cases/161811_warner_
bros_complaint_exhibits.pdf.
175 Though SivHD or PewDiePie were unlikely themselves to be familiar
with disclosure laws, both are sophisticated parties that could be expected to
recognize the importance of complying with disclosure laws or contract with
attorneys knowledgeable on the issue. See, e.g., GameJunky0826, What Ever
Happened to SivHD?, REDDIT (Sept. 16, 2016), https://www.reddit.com/r/
leagueoflegends/comments/533hyk/what_ever_happened_to_sivhd/; Kevin
Roose, What Does PewDiePie Really Believe? N.Y. TIMES MAGAZINE (Oct. 9,
2019), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/10/09/magazine/PewDiePie-
interview.html.
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site.176 The site facilitated the gambling of “skins” from an online
shooter game known as Counter-Strike: Global Offensive,177 and
charged an 8% fee on the bets.178 Martin and Cassell posted on their
personal YouTube channels as users of this website without
disclosing their ownership of it.179 Martin “discovered” the website
in a video and claimed he won $69 in a bet.180 He then went on to
talk about how nice the owners were on Twitter as well as the
possibility of a future sponsorship.181 The pair continued posting
videos with large sums of money listed in the title, including values
of $13,000 and $24,000. Neither ever disclosed their ownership of
the site.182 In response, the FTC enjoined the influencers from,
among other things, failing to disclose their connections in future
endeavors clearly and conspicuously, and required that all use of
endorsers be monitored, with clear guidance to endorsers to disclose
their material connections.183
CSGOLotto can be seen as a step forward for the FTC. Rather
shockingly, CSGOLotto is the only cases where influencers
themselves have been enforced against by the FTC.184 Because the
176 Complaint ¶ 7, CSGOLotto, Inc., 164 F.T.C. 785 (No. C-4632), available
at https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/cases/1623184_c-_csgolotto_
complaint.pdf.
177 Id. ¶ 6.
178 Skins, which can be bought and sold for real world money, are specific
colorations of in game assets (like guns, knives, etc.) and have generated an out-
of-game market. See, e.g., Operation Broken Fang Case, CS:GO STASH,
https://csgostash.com (last visited Mar. 19, 2021). See also Jacob Wolf, Federal
Trade Commission Settles with Owners of CSGO Lotto, ESPN (Sept. 8, 2017),
https://www.espn.com/esports/story/_/id/20635149/federal-trade-commission-
settles-owners-csgo-lotto (“Eilers & Krejcik Gaming and Narus Advisors
estimated that skin betting was a $5 billion marketplace in 2016 . . . .”).
179 Complaint, supra note 176, ¶¶ 7, 9; see also, Marie Antoinette, How to
Win $13,000 in 5 Minutes CS GO Betting(Tmartn Deleted Video), YOUTUBE (July
4, 2016), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1v6t6iqhoSI.
180 Complaint, supra note 176, ¶ 9.
181 Id.
182 Id. ¶ 27.
183 Decision and Order at 3–4, CSGOLotto, 164 F.T.C. 785 (No. C-4632),
available at https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/cases/1623184_c-
_csgolotto_decision_and_order.pdf.
184 See FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 22 (stating that this was the first
ever enforcement against individual influencers).
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FTC acknowledged that the influencers had used their popularity
and trust within their follower base to deceive individuals, it took a
step towards enforcement against influencers for their own part in
the deception.185 In doing so, CSGOLotto indicates that the FTC not
only acknowledged influencers’ agency in violating the law, but
recognized the value in enforcing against those violations.
But CSGOLotto is not that clear of a step forward from
Machinima. In CSGOLotto, the FTC may have enforced against
influencers, but it did so because the influencers were themselves
the owners and operators of a deceptive company.186 In fact, other
gaming influencers were hired by the respondents,187 all of whom
were well-established influencers (and paid accordingly),188 and
none of whom were enforced against.189 The key difference
regarding CSGOLotto is the influencers’ ownership in the
company.190 As in other cases, the contracted influencers were not
enforced against while the ownership of the company was.191 So
while the FTC acknowledged the importance of Cassell and
Martin’s influencer status to the operation of the deceptive scheme,
it is unclear whether the pair would have been enforced against had
185 See Complaint, supra note 176, ¶¶ 25–28.
186 See generally Decision and Order, supra note 183; see also Charlie Hall,
CSGO Lotto’s Lawyer Says It Was Never a Gambling Site, and Here’s Why,
POLYGON (Dec. 18, 2017), https://www.polygon.com/2017/12/18/16782124
/csgo-lotto-lawsuit-gambling-terms-of-use-tmartn.
187 Complaint, supra note 176, ¶ 20.
188 See, e.g., GoldGloveTV, YOUTUBE, https://www.youtube.com
/goldglovetv (last visited Jan. 22, 2021) (boasting 1.2 million followers, just on
YouTube, at the time of this publication). Payments involved ranged from $2,500
to $55,000 for advertising the website. Complaint, supra note 176, ¶ 19.
189 See generally Decision and Order, supra note 183. Ironically, in the press
release, past FTC Commissioner Olhausen stated, “[c]onsumers need to know
when social media influencers are being paid or have any other material
connection to the brands endorsed in their posts.” FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra,
note 23. In fact, then-acting commissioner Olhausen went further to state, “This
action, the FTC’s first against individual influencers, should send a message that
such connections must be clearly disclosed so consumers can make informed
purchasing decisions.” Id. Yet, as explained, the actual enforcement does not
reflect this sentiment.
190 See Complaint, supra note 176, ¶¶ 2–3.
191 See discussion infra Part III, Sections F–G.
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they simply been contracted to do exactly what they did by an
outside party.
F. Telomerase: The Backslide Begins
In In re Telomerase Activation Sciences, Inc.,192 the FTC
pursued an enforcement action against Telomerase Activation
Sciences (“TAS”), a company that sold what were purportedly anti-
aging drugs.193 In the process of selling those drugs, TAS utilized
ads, endorsers, and even TV hosts to push their product.194 The
campaign included a stint on the Suzanne Show for the cost of
$89,000.195 That show was hosted by Suzanne Somers.196 During
that segment, both individuals representing TAS and Suzanne
Somers spoke about the positive effects of the company’s anti-aging
products, in what essentially amounted to a paid-for, segment-length
commercial for TAS’ products.197 However, it was never disclosed
that the segment was paid for.198 Even after the segment was
finished airing, the Suzanne Show agreed to continue to feature the
drugs in its advertising campaigns.199 The FTC brought an
enforcement action against TAS for false establishment, false
efficacy, as well as claims for deceptive format and failure to
disclose material connections, among other claims.200
192 Telomerase Activation Sciences, Inc., 165 F.T.C. 558 (2018).
193 Complaint ¶ 10, Telomerase, 165 F.T.C. 558 (No. C-4644), available at
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/cases/142_3103_-_telomerase_
complaint_final.pdf.
194 See, e.g., id. ¶¶ 9, 27, 31.
195 Id. ¶ 26.
196 Id.
197 See Exhibit G, Telomerase, 165 F.T.C. 558 (No. C-4644), available at
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/cases/142_3103_-_telomerase_
complaint_ex_g_ta-65_infomercial_0.mp4; see also Exhibit H, Telomerase, 165
F.T.C. 558 (No. C-4644), available at https://www.ftc.gov/system/files
/documents/cases/1423103telomerasecmpltexhh_0.pdf.
198 Complaint, supra note 193, ¶ 32.
199 Id. ¶ 28.
200 See generally id. ¶¶ 42–55.
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Returning to the pre-CSGOLotto trend, the FTC did not enforce
against Somers.201 Telomerase can be viewed as somewhat
confirming the suspicion that had Martin and Cassell not been the
operators of the deception—in other words, had they merely been
influencers contracted to work their influencer magic—the FTC
would not have enforced against them.
Telomerase goes beyond this conclusion and indicates a
significant backslide. While the FTC brought a count against TAS
for providing the means and instrumentalities to deceive against the
company, it did not pursue any action against Somers.202 If any
influencer should have known that their non-disclosure was
deceptive, it would have been Somers. After all, Somers was (and
is) a seasoned TV personality, and not an unsophisticated party.203
Whether or not Somers knew that the product was faulty, it would
be difficult for her not to have understood that she was failing to
disclose a material connection to the individuals and the product that
she was broadcasting to her audience.204 That the FTC’s complaint
discusses her participation at length and indicates she furthered that
deception for her own gain, but lets her go unpunished, is irrational
and asymmetric.205
G. Creaxion: The Backslide Continues
In In re Creaxion Corporation, and its related case, In re Inside
Publications, LLC,206 the FTC brought an enforcement action
against Inside Publications and Creaxion Corporation.207 Creaxion
201 See generally Decision and Order, Telomerase, 165 F.T.C. 558 (No. C-
4644), available at https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/cases/142_
3103_-_telomerase_decision_and_order_final.pdf.
202 See Complaint, supra note 193, ¶ 53–55.
203 E.g., SUZANNE SOMERS, https://www.suzannesomers.com/ (last visited
Jan. 22, 2021).
204 See Complaint, supra note 193, ¶ 41.
205 See id. ¶¶ 26–33.
206 Inside Publications, LLC, FTC File No. 172 3067 (Nov. 13, 2018)
(complaint), available at https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/cases/172_
3066_cre-ip_complaint_0.pdf.
207 See generally Complaint, Creaxion Corp., FTC File No. 172 3066 (Nov.
13, 2018), available at https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/cases/172_
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was enlisted by a company called HealthPro Brands to market and
promote HealthPro’s mosquito repellent in the face of the
worldwide Zika outbreak.208 Creaxion operated as a broker between
HealthPro and Inside Publications, and the three parties agreed to a
“‘Social and Digital Media Activation and Athlete Engagement’
agreement” in which Inside Publications agreed to, among other
things, publish two articles praising the mosquito repellent, create a
gift basket with the mosquito repellent that would be given to
American Olympians, and utilize ex-Olympian influencers as
endorsers and supply those influencers with pre-written posts.209 In
its complaint the FTC alleged, among other violations, that no
disclosure was given that would indicate that endorsers were not
offering their independent, impartial opinions and no disclosure of
material connections between the influencers, the publisher, and the
product were disclosed.210
The FTC focused on the culpability of Creaxion and Inside
Publications for the deceptive and misleading statements made by
the two contracted influencers.211 The exhibits outlined in the
complaint itself show scripted media advertising.212 But a closer
look at the full list of exhibits shows that the influencers had creative
license over what they said.213 For example, the exhibits show, in
addition to the scripted posts, more creative posts by the contracted
influencers that contain exorbitant claims—such as Carly
Patterson’s comment that the mosquito repellent protected her from
Zika carrying mosquitos.214 These comments were not completely
3066_cre-ip_complaint.pdf (indicating the underlying reasons behind the
enforcement).
208 Id. ¶ 7.
209 Id. ¶¶ 8–9.
210 Id. ¶¶ 25–33.
211 Id.
212 See, e.g., id. ¶¶ 15–19.
213 Jake Dalton posted, “Getting Rio Ready! Not worried about Zika. Fit
Organic has my back and body covered. Love the Fit mosquito repellent.” Exhibit
C at 1, Creaxion Corp., FTC File No. 172 3066 (Nov. 13, 2018), available at
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/cases/172_3066_cre-ip_compl_
exhibits_a-g.pdf.
214 Patterson made this comment despite previously admitting over social
media that she personally would not be participating in the Olympics. See Exhibit
B at 1, Creaxion Corp., FTC File No. 172 3066 (Nov. 13, 2018), available at
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false (protection generally from mosquitos would protect from Zika
virus-carrying mosquitos), but they certainly stretched the truth and
potentially put the lives of others at risk.215 The same was true of the
other influencer, Jake Dalton. His social media posts included
statements that he was not afraid of Zika because the mosquito
repellent “ha[d] [his] back and body covered.”216 While the FTC
complaint only included advertisements that were prefabricated and
standardized, the exhibits indicated that both influencers were
involved in the writing and posting of deceptive, false, and
potentially life-threatening information during the Zika
pandemic.217 Despite having willingly propagated possibly the most
dangerous deception of any of the influencer cases discussed, the
FTC still did not enforce against them.
H. Teami, the Current Standard: Enforce Against
Companies, Educate Influencers
In FTC v. Teami, the FTC brought an enforcement action under
Section 5(a) and Section 12 of the FTC Act against an online tea
seller.218 Teami sold multiple blends of teas and tea products
through its online store.219 On its website, Teami advertised that its
tea blends had specific health benefits, such as colon detoxification
and weight loss.220 Teami advertised its products through its own
social media posts, as well as via the posts of paid influencers,221 a
number of whom are pop-culture celebrities.222 In its complaint, the
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/cases/172_3066_cre-ip_compl_
exhibits_a-g.pdf.
215 See Zika, CDC, https://www.cdc.gov/dotw/zika/index.html (last visited
Jan. 22, 2021).
216 See Exhibit C, supra note 213, at 1.
217 See generally id.; supra note 214.
218 Complaint ¶ 4, FTC v. Teami, LLC, FTC File No. 182 3174, No. 8:20-
CV-518 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 5, 2020), available at https://www.ftc.gov/system/files
/documents/cases/complaint_4.pdf.
219 Id. ¶ 11.
220 Id. ¶ 14.
221 These included Demi Lovato, Cardi B, and Adrienne Eliza Houghton,
among others. Id. ¶¶ 11, 20.
222 Id. ¶¶ 20–21. These totaled tens-of-millions of views. For example, Cardi
B’s post alone garnered 20.4 million views. Id. ¶ 20.
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FTC alleged Teami had misrepresented the effects of using their
products and had failed to disclose material connections in
advertising.223 The FTC also stated that it had previously reached
out to the defendants to inform them of their need to create a
disclosure policy for its influencers.224 The FTC then noted that
Teami agreed to implement policies which would require disclosure
and post content monitoring by Teami, but Teami failed to enforce
these policies.225 In response to these violations, the FTC and Teami
stipulated to a monetary judgment of $15,209,452, with
$14,209,452 suspended upon the payment of $1 million.226 The FTC
also ordered an injunction against Teami’s assertion of false claims
related to the health effects of its tea products227 and mandated
disclosure of material connections in its advertising.228 Finally, the
FTC sent out “Warning Letters to Instagram Influencers to
Prominently Disclose Paid Endorsements” to the influencers
involved.229
A closer look at the decision reveals that the thrust of the press
release and the enforcement concerned just how deceptive the
influencer advertising of Teami’s products was. In its enforcement,
the FTC included a forty-nine page, twenty-six exhibit list indicating
just how deeply involved Teami’s influencers were in propagating
its deception.230 The FTC found that Teami relied on influencers in
223 Id. ¶ 25–30.
224 Id. ¶¶ 16–19.
225 Id.
226 Stipulated Order for Permanent Injunction and Monetary Judgement at
13–14, FTC v. Teami, LLC, FTC File No. 182 3174, No. 8:20-CV-518 (M.D. Fla.
Mar. 17, 2020), available at https://www.ftc.gov/enforcement/cases-proceedings
/182-3174/teami-llc.
227 Id. at 5–6.
228 Id. at 11–12.
229 See Warning Letters to Instagram Influencers to Prominently Disclose
Paid Endorsements, FED. TRADE COMM’N (2020), https://www.ftc.gov/system
/files/documents/cases/1823174teamiwarningletters.pdf.
230 Exhibits 9–13, FTC v. Teami, LLC, FTC File No. 182 3174, No. 8:20-
CV-518 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 5, 2020), available at https://www.ftc.gov/system/files
/documents/cases/1823174teamicomplaint_exhibits1-26.pdf (including
statements like “[t]his detox is my all time FAVE [sic] . . . especially because I
see a difference within like 3 days . . . . I’ve been drinking it now for a week and
I’ve already lost about 3 pounds . . . insane.” (emphasis added)).
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a variety of fields—from singers to fashion models, pop culture
icons, and fitness icons.231 In total, these influencers had the ability
to reach tens of millions of followers on Instagram alone.232 The
FTC also acknowledged that Teami had guidelines for influencer
posting requirements,233 even if Teami’s own enforcement of those
guidelines was insufficient.234
The influencers involved were not micro-influencers. Instead, a
number of the influencers on Teami’s payroll were household pop-
culture names who are themselves sophisticated, or have access to
sophisticated business teams.235 Yet the FTC chose not to enforce
against these parties, and instead sent out what it called “Warning
Letters to Instagram Influencers to Prominently Disclose Paid
Endorsements.”236 In the warning letters, the FTC gave the
influencers legal advice regarding how they could comply with FTC
regulation in the future.237 The letters also “strongly
recommend[ed]” that the influencers review its Disclosures 101
guide.238 The strongest enforcement within the letter was that the
FTC required a written response requesting that influencers describe
how they will alter their social media activities to comply with its
rules.239
In spilling Teami’s tea, the FTC’s enforcement can best be
described as curiously asymmetric. While the FTC was at pains to
231 Complaint, supra note 218, at 14 (listing Cardi B, Brittany Renner, and
Leyla Milani-Khoshbin, among others).
232 See id.
233 See id. ¶¶ 16–18.
234 Id.
235 See supra notes 218–224, 231 and accompanying text. These influencers
have large following bases, but several are contracted to companies which
represent them. E.g., Cardi B, CAA, https://www.caa.com/entertainmenttalent
/touring/artist/cardib (last visited Jan. 22, 2021). Demi Lovato provides a more
recent indication of sophistication as a party. See Shirley Halperin, Demi Lovato
Signs with Scooter Braun for Management, VARIETY (May 11, 2019), https://
variety.com/2019/music/news/demi-lovato-signs-scooter-braun-manager-
1203212073/.
236 See generally FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 229.
237 See, e.g., id. at 2.
238 Id.
239 Id.
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point out the strength of its enforcement,240 it also provided arguably
better reasoning for enforcement against the influencers involved.241
While the FTC was clear that the use of influencers was key to
Teami’s social media deception and Section 5 violation, its non-
enforcement against sophisticated influencers who broke with
Teami’s internal social media policy was starkly in contrast to its
enforcement against Teami.242 The FTC fined Teami $15.2 million
(suspended after the payment of 1 million), and the influencers
received a letter requiring them to do the bare minimum.243 This
asymmetry aptly describes the current standard: aggressively
enforce against businesses, but slap influencers on the wrist.
I. Outside the Enforcement Regime 2017–2020
While the disclosure standard has long been applied to
endorsements in advertising content, it has not been widely applied
to influencers in enforcement actions involving social media
influencer-produced content. Instead, akin to the Teami paradigm,
the FTC’s efforts at stemming influencer non-compliance have been
focused on education.244
In April 2017 the FTC sent ninety “educational letters” to
marketers and influencers to remind them that they must disclose
material connections.245 Then, in September 2017, twenty-one
influencers received follow-up warning letters regarding potential
failures to disclose material connections.246 That month, the FTC
brought its first enforcement action against social media influencers
that failed to disclose their joint ownership of companies whose
240 See FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 36 (discussing the variety of
sanctions imposed by the FTC and the severity of the sanctions).




244 See, e.g., FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 21.
245 See FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 23.
246 See Lesley Fair, Three FTC Actions of Interest to Influencers, FED.
TRADECOMM’N (Sept. 7, 2017), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/blogs/business
-blog/2017/09/three-ftc-actions-interest-influencers.
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products they advertised.247 The FTC also updated its FAQs in
September 2017,248 telling influencers: (1) Use clear and
unambiguous disclosure language; (2) do not bury disclosures; (3)
comply with the Enforcement Guides when tagging a brand; (4)
consider all potential material connections; (5) disclose any
connection that would be relevant to how the consumer views the
endorsement; and (6) disclose within images on image-only
platforms.249
This was followed in November of 2019 by the FTC’s
“Disclosures 101 for Social Media Influencers,”250 an eight-page
brochure that took the form of a soft approach to education, as
opposed to the imposing letter format.251 However, the brochure
also indicated that influencers bore the affirmative requirement of
disclosure of material connections, familiarity with the Endorsement
Guides, and compliance with the law.252 Though this did not break
with endorsement disclosure regulations generally,253 the brochure’s
247 Id.; see also supra Part III.E (discussing the enforcement action in
CSGOLotto).
248 See Fair, supra note 246.
249 See FTC’s Endorsement Guides: What People Are Asking, FED. TRADE
COMM’N (Sept. 2017), https://www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/business-center/guidance
/ftcs-endorsement-guides-what-people-are-asking.
250 FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 21. It should be noted that this is not
the only educational effort the FTC has made. The FTC has engaged in a wide
variety of educational activities regarding deception. See, e.g., Advertisement
Endorsements, FED. TRADE COMM’N, https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/media-
resources/truth-advertising/advertisement-endorsements (last visited Apr. 12,
2021) (providing resources for related public events held by the FTC, as well as
public statements and reports).
251 See FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 249.
252 FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 21, at 2 (“As an influencer, it’s your
responsibility to make these disclosures, to be familiar with the Endorsement
Guides, and to comply with laws against deceptive ads. Don’t rely on others to do
it for you.”).
253 For example, the FTC’s guide, What People Are Asking, published in
September of 2017, stated that influencers are required to self-regulate by
disclosing. See FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 249. (“Yes, an endorsement can
be aspirational. It’s an endorsement if the blogger is explicitly or implicitly
expressing his or her views about the sports car (e.g., “I want this car”). If the
blogger was paid, it should be disclosed.”). The FTC’s 2009 publication of the
Endorsement Guides represented the first time that the FTC explicitly required
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requirements placed the onus on influencers where every influencer
enforcement but CSGOLotto had not.
While likely well intentioned, FTC’s gentler, educational
method accomplished little.254 Empirical data indicates that the vast
majority of influencers continued (and still continue) to violate
disclosure requirements.255 In response to the recent, but
unrelenting, issue of influencer non-compliance, at least one FTC
Commissioner argued in favor of essentially returning to the
Machinima method—just enforce against businesses.256 Having
failed to accomplish its goals through enforcement (almost entirely
against businesses), the FTC also failed to accomplish those same
goals by educating influencers.
IV. PUBLIC COMMENTS AND THE 2020 NOPR
The FTC, as evidenced by the line of enforcements just
discussed, has not responded to the growing use of influencers in
advertising, endorsements, and product promotions. Despite a clear,
acknowledged authority to apply the deception standard, the FTC
influencers to disclose material connections, these policies were later codified in
the Code of Federal Regulations. See generally 16 C.F.R. § 255 (2021); Guides
Concerning the Use of Endorsements and Testimonials in Advertising, FED.
TRADE COMM’N (2009), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/attachments
/press-releases/ftc-publishes-final-guides-governing-endorsements-testimonials
/091005revisedendorsementguides.pdf.
254 Robin Langford, Three Quarters of Instagram Influencers Hide Their
Advertisement Disclosure in Their Posts, NETIMPERATIVE (Sept. 22, 2020),
http://www.netimperative.com/2020/09/22/three-quarters-of-instagram-
influencers-hide-their-advertisement-disclosure-in-their-posts-2/ (“More than
three quarters of influencer adverts on Instagram have the disclosure hidden
somewhere in the post, whether that be in the middle, at the end or in a comment,
according to new research.”).
255 Id.
256 Statement of Commissioner Rohit Chopra Regarding the Endorsement
Guides Review Commission File No. P204500, FED. TRADE COMM’N (Feb. 12,
2020), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/1566445
/p204500_-_endorsement_guides_reg_review_-_chopra_stmt.pdf (“When
individual influencers are able to post about their interests to earn extra money on
the side, this is not a cause for major concern. But when companies launder
advertising by paying someone for a seemingly authentic endorsement or review,
this is illegal payola.”).
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has not brought meaningful enforcement actions against influencers.
Worse, the FTC has yet to find an influencer liable solely for their
role in deceiving the public as an advertising mechanism for another
organization. All of this despite the empirical backdrop of 86%
influencer non-compliance.257 Instead of taking action against
influencers, in February of 2020 the FTC once again to balked on
using its enforcement authority, choosing instead to include
questions on the issue of social media influencers in its regularly
scheduled ten-year review of the agency’s endorsement
guidelines.258
During this review, the FTC solicited public comment on “the
economic impact of and the continuing need for its Endorsement
Guides; possible conflict between the Guides and state, local,
federal, or international laws; and the effect of any technological,
economic, environmental, or other industry changes on the
Guides.”259 Three of the twenty-two areas the agency solicited
comment on involved endorsements and social media.260
For example, Premise 14 asked:
How well are advertisers and endorsers disclosing
unexpected material connections on social media
platforms? Does this depend on the type of material
connection? What disclosures of material
connections are sufficiently clear
(i.e., understandable) to consumers when used in
social media? What disclosures of material
connection currently being used in social media are
likely not understood by consumers? Does the
sufficiency or insufficiency vary by platform, type of
material connection (e.g., a paid post versus a free
product), or other factors, and, if so, how? To the
extent that these connections are not being
adequately disclosed, do the problems tend to be in
the substance of the disclosures or in their
257 See infra note 293; see also INFLUENCERMKTG. HUB, supra note 19.
258 Guides Concerning the Use of Endorsements and Testimonials in
Advertising, 85 Fed. Reg. 10104 (Feb. 21, 2020).
259 Id.
260 Id.
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conspicuousness (e.g., placement, visibility, or
audibility)? Should the Guides provide more detail
on what disclosures of material connections are
sufficiently clear or unclear in different social media
formats? Does the fact that Commission Guides are
generally reviewed every ten years affect your
answer as to whether providing more detail would be
helpful?261
Likewise Premise 19 sought comment on citizen knowledge of
influencer advertising:
Some advertisers contend that consumers who use
social media understand that influencers who
promote products are generally doing so only
because they are paid or given something by the
marketer, regardless of what or whether disclosures
appear in social media posts. What evidence is there
to support or contradict this assertion and does the
answer differ depending on the nature of the material
connection? In particular cases, what factors might
be considered to determine whether a material
connection is unexpected? Do consumer
expectations vary by the age of the audience, the
product category, the nature of the influencer, the
format or substance of the endorsement, or
otherwise, and if so, how?262
And Premise 20 asked for comment on the relationship between
influencers and affiliate links:
Some endorsers (including the authors of some
product reviews) include affiliate links that can be
used to purchase the products they are endorsing.
Should the Guides address such links, and if so, how?
To what extent do consumers expect that these
endorsers are compensated for purchases through
those links? If so, what compensation arrangements
do consumers ordinarily expect? To what extent
would knowing of such compensation affect the
261 Id.
262 Id.
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weight or credibility given to those endorsements? Is
there a distinction in terms of either consumer
expectations or the weight ascribed to an
endorsement between affiliate links to a product’s
marketer and affiliate links to one or more retailers?
If so, how, why, and how should that be addressed?
263
The initial inquiry was set to run from February 21 to April 21,
2020,264 but the agency extended the deadline for responses until
June 21, 2020.265 During the four months, the FTC received 118
comments through a comment portal on Regulations.gov.266 At the
close of the comment period, all 118 comments were obtained from
the website for analysis. Each comment was read and categorized
for five specific attributes:
1. Did the comment mention social media influencers or refer
to questions 14, 19 or 20?
2. Does the text of the comment advocate for stronger
enforcement of the agency’s endorsement guidelines?
3. Did the comment contain evidence (empirical or otherwise)
or was it a simple opinion?
4. Did the commenter indicate a belief that social media
influencers or social media influencer-produced content could be
deceptive under the current standard?
5. Was the commenter associated with the advertising
industry?
Quantitatively, of the 118 comments received, only nine of the
comments did not address influencers directly or respond to
263 Id.
264 Id.
265 See Guides Concerning the Use of Endorsements and Testimonials in
Advertising, 85 Fed. Reg. 19,709 (Apr. 8, 2020) (“The Commission believes that
a two-month extension is appropriate. Accordingly, it has decided to extend the
deadline for submission of comments on the Endorsement Guides to Monday,
June 22, 2020.”).
266 See Fed. Trade Comm’n., Proposed Rule: Guides Concerning the Use of
Endorsements and Testimonials in Advertising, REGULATIONS.GOV, https://
www.regulations.gov/document/FTC-2020-0017-0001/comment (last visited
Mar. 14, 2020).
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questions 14, 19 or 20 posed by the agency.267 Thirty comments
came from advertising industry or trade groups.268 Sixteen of the
comments were opposed to any additional regulation of social media
influencers, and nineteen of them argued that social media
influencers were not engaged in deceptive practices currently.269
In response to the FTC’s larger inquiry, a combined total of
twenty-eight of the 118 comments did not advocate for stronger
enforcement mechanisms and thirty-two did not indicate a belief or
provide evidence that influencer conduct was deceptive
in some way.270 Eighty-one of the 118 comments advocated, in at
least some language, for stronger enforcement by the agency, and
two comments in this category also argued for promulgation of rules
that would provide a parity with the regulation of social media
influencer content in Europe.271
Coders also took qualitative notes about the themes of the
comments. Comment length ranged from a single sentence
advocating for disclosure guidelines similar to the FTC’s regulation
of online native advertising, to detailed filings with examples of
influencers who are violating the current guidelines under the
November 2019 Disclosures 101, from pro-consumer advocacy




270 See, e.g., Am. Influencer Council, Inc., Comment on Guides Concerning
the Use of Endorsements and Testimonials in Advertising (Apr. 19, 2020), https://
beta.regulations.gov/comment/FTC-2020-0017-0078 (arguing that influencers
are not engaging in deceptive practices).
271 One such comment argued that “[i]nfluencer marketing is not a national
issue: as an illustration, influencers from the United States have a European
fanbase, and viceversa [sic]. For this reason, regulatory developments should
ideally be coordinated, or at least need to circulate beyond the jurisdiction where
they originate. Similarly, the study of influencer marketing ought to take into
account the post-jurisdictional nature of social media.” Maastricht Univ.,
Comment on Guides Concerning the Use of Endorsements and Testimonials in
Advertising (Apr. 22, 2020), https://www.regulations.gov/comment/FTC-2020-
0017-0082.
272 Truth in Advert., Inc., Comment on Guides Concerning the Use of
Endorsements and Testimonials in Advertising (Jun. 22, 2020), https://
www.regulations.gov/comment/FTC-2020-0017-0108.
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opposed to additional regulations came from a self-described social
media influencer advocacy organization, called the American
Influencer Council.273
A pair of the comments were focused primarily on the issue of
deception by social media influencers who produce content targeted
at children.274 A significant series of the comments in the inquiry
docket were filed by what appeared to be university students, with
one entry’s attachment titled “Extra Credit” that included a student’s
name and course number in the upper left of the document.275 Two
comments conflated the FTC’s endorsement guidelines with the
similar and longstanding sponsorship identification rules enforced
on broadcast radio and television stations by the FCC.276
Multiple commenters proposed that the agency’s ten-year cycle
for reviewing its endorsement guidelines was too long.277 In one
273 See Am. Influencer Council, Inc., supra note 270.
274 Common Sense Media, Comment on Guides Concerning the Use of
Endorsements and Testimonials in Advertising (June 22, 2020), https://
www.regulations.gov/comment/FTC-2020-0017-0095.
275 Serena Maldonado, Comment on Guides Concerning the Use of
Endorsements and Testimonials in Advertising (Mar. 31, 2020), https://
www.regulations.gov/comment/FTC-2020-0017-0069.
276 47 CFR § 73.1212 (2020); Mihir Kshirsagar, Comment on Guides
Concerning the Use of Endorsements and Testimonials in Advertising (June 22,
2020), https://www.regulations.gov/comment/FTC-2020-0017-0103; see also
Nat’l Retail Fed., Comment on Guides Concerning the Use of Endorsements and
Testimonials in Advertising (June 21, 2020), https://www.regulations.gov
/comment/FTC-2020-0017-0097.
277 E.g., Jane Weesner, Comment on Guides Concerning the Use of
Endorsements and Testimonials in Advertising (Mar. 21, 2020), https://
www.regulations.gov/comment/FTC-2020-0017-0010 (“[I]t is not realistic that a
review every ten years can capture the new ways in which our world
communicates. . . . [T]he FTC should review their guides at least every five
years.”); Jake Zeidman, Comment on Guides Concerning the Use of
Endorsements and Testimonials in Advertising (Mar. 29, 2020), https://
www.regulations.gov/comment/FTC-2020-0017-0044 (“Social media is
constantly emerging, and the guidelines need to be reviewed more often than
every 10 years.”); Sofia W., Comment on Guides Concerning the Use of
Endorsements and Testimonials in Advertising (Mar. 10, 2020) https://
www.regulations.gov/comment/FTC-2020-0017-0007 (“I believe it would be of
the best interest for the FTC to review their guidelines every 3–4 years, rather than
every 10 years.”).
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example, the commenter suggested an annual review process, while
others argued for three and five-year cycles.278 Another themewhich
appeared in multiple comments, including one focused on the
activities of “e-sports” influencers, proposed that the FTC needed to
be more specific about when disclosures are required for influencers
as well as additional specificity about the language the agency
would like to see in posts.279 Likewise, the majority of the comments
filed by advertising industry representatives advocated for more
clarity regarding when the existing rules apply to content, but argued
against additional regulations, especially as they related to the
content produced by social media influencers.280 One comment
proposed some revisions to the existing guidelines, rather than
expanding them, but argued that a more expansive scheme of
industry self-regulation was preferable to FTC action.281
278 NetChoice, Comment on Guides Concerning the Use of Endorsements
and Testimonials in Advertising (June 21, 2020), https://www.regulations.gov
/comment/FTC-2020-0017-0090; see also Am. Influencer Council, Inc., supra
note 270.
279 Esports Bar Ass’n, Comment on Guides Concerning the Use of
Endorsements and Testimonials in Advertising (June 21, 2020), https://
www.regulations.gov/comment/FTC-2020-0017-0113.
280 Nat’l Retail Fed., supra note 276; see also Performance Mktg. Ass’n,
Comment on Guides Concerning the Use of Endorsements and Testimonials in
Advertising (June 21, 2020), https://www.regulations.gov/comment/FTC-2020-
0017-0089 (entitling the first heading: “Greater Clarity on What Constitutes
Disclosure is Needed”); Performance-Driven Mktg. Inst., Comment on Guides
Concerning the Use of Endorsements and Testimonials in Advertising (June 22,
2020), https://www.regulations.gov/comment/FTC-2020-0017-0094 (“PDMI’s
major concern is that the Commission avoid ‘one size fits all’ rules of disclosure
which would chill the effective communication of advertising messages while not
adding in an appreciable way to the useful information made available to
consumers.”); Ass’n of Nat’l Advertisers, Comment on Guides Concerning the
Use of Endorsements and Testimonials in Advertising (June 22, 2020),
https://www.regulations.gov/comment/FTC-2020-0017-0091 (“While instructive
in many ways, the current Guides do not adequately address current social media
realities and related consumer behavior. Instead, they provide several outdated
examples that are difficult for many to apply, particularly in the current media
landscape.”).
281 Kshirsagar, supra note 276.
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V. DISCUSSIONS OF CHANGING FTC ENFORCEMENT POLICY
The FTC’s apparent desire to keep kicking the social media
influencer can down the road is unsustainable if the agency intends
to continue to serve as a consumer protection entity. Non-disclosure
of material connections by influencers concerning payment by
businesses to advertise products has become a systemic problem.282
The violations have become so normalized that an otherwise
regulation-averse advertising industry now admits that something
must be done to outline what kind of advertising is permissible.283
Despite the fact that the FTC has brought powerful online entities
like Google, Snapchat and Facebook to heel using deception
enforcement, it has been reluctant to apply its enforcement authority
to the users of those platforms engaged in what even the agency
itself has acknowledged are deceptive practices.284
We believe the regulatory answer to the issue of influencer
deception is quite simple. The FTC just needs to use its enforcement
authority against influencers who engage in deceptive practices. We
believe a minimum of six to eight enforcement actions across the
realm of the influencer economy is past due. Influencers at various
follower levels ranging from nano to mega should be enforced
against. But it is also critical that the advertisers, affiliate groups,
and brands that utilize influencers, but fail to proactively require
282 See supra Part III.
283 See supra Part IV.
284 See generally supra Part III. Interestingly, when compared to the FCC’s
enforcement, the FTC’s non-enforcement is particularly odd. Comparatively,
even the normally content enforcement-reluctant Federal Communications
Commission maintains a low tolerance for complaints dealing with non-
disclosure for sponsored broadcast elements. See 47 C.F.R. § 73.1212 (2020)
(requiring disclosure for video news releases). Aside from the $13 million fine
assessed to Sinclair for failure to comply with the rules under § 73.1212 while
running video news releases, the FCC has assessed fines for non-disclosure in
cases involving brokered political news content and even for actively failing to
include the name of a business in a regularly scheduled advertisement. See
Sinclair Broad. Grp., Inc., 32 FCC Rcd. 10853, 10853 (2017) (fining Sinclair
Broadcast Group $13,376,200). While broadcasters languish under rules that are
still stringently enforced, social media influencers have been given a universal
hall pass by the FTC to continue to engage in deceptive practices.
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disclosure compliance among their paid endorsers, be enforced
against as well.
This rights three specific issues with the discussed line of
enforcements. First, in finally enforcing against an influencer as part
and parcel of a deceptive scheme, the FTC would reverse the
harmful precedent of the previous enforcements.285 For example, in
enforcing against an influencer, the FTC would reverse its precedent
in Creaxion and Telomerase and finally acknowledge that
influencers have sufficient agency to comply or not comply with
federal deception laws.286 Bringing an enforcement would also
recognize that influencers are engaged in business practices as
influencers, which CSGOLotto got right, but Warner Bros. Home
Entertainment,Machinima, and Lord & Taylor did not.287 Doing so
would also set clear precedent for future enforcement, the
metaphorical stick that has been largely missing from deception
enforcement of influencers. Most importantly, this will reestablish
the FTC’s enforcement credibility on consumer protection against
deceptive claims and undisclosed material connections, things that
all evidence demonstrates social media influencers are delivering in
large quantities.288
Second, the FTC needs to set some guideposts by engaging in
some enforcement actions against social media influencers who are
serial violators of deception rules. The guideposts do not have to be
uniform for every kind of influencer. Engaging in several
285 See supra Part III.
286 For example, some marketers have argued that influencer marketing
differs from traditional marketing strategy in part because influencers need to be
given room to run to create the kind of content that feels authentic. 100 Influencer
Marketing Statistics for 2021, INFLUENCER MKTG. HUB (Feb. 24, 2021),
https://influencermarketinghub.com/influencer-marketing-statistics/. This view
requires the implicit assumption that influencers are capable of producing quality
work that fits within a specific request’s purview, without going too far afield
from what their authentic content should be like for consumers. Id. (“For
influencer marketing to sustain, authenticity and credibility is key.”). By this view
marketers should not smother influencers by asserting full control because that
would stymie the effectiveness of utilizing influencers in the first place. Id.
(“[T]oday’s consumer can tell the difference between an advert, a personal
recommendation, and an advert masked under a personal recommendation.”).
287 See supra Part III.
288 See Chan, supra note 64, at 332–33.
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enforcements would allow the FTC to tailor specific protocol
requirements to specific kinds of influencers. For example, gaming
influencers, like those in Warner Bros. and Machinima, are often
engaged in different forms of influencer campaigns, may be most
active on gaming-centric social media platforms, and may violate
disclosure requirements in different ways from fashion
influencers.289 This is simply one example, but by creating
guideposts for different kinds of influencers, the FTC can effectively
create expectations of what is required for both influencers and the
businesses which contract with them. This will balance the use of
influencers in social media with endorsements or endorsers that
appear in advertising in other mediums.
Third, it will put advertisers and influencers on notice that non-
compliance with the agency’s disclosure requirements could result
in some expensive consequences. Several enforcements could create
reasonable expectations of sanction for size and kind of influencer.
Multiple and varied types of enforcement actions would give the
FTC the opportunity to set precedent that acknowledges that each
level of influencer possesses a different level of sophistication, and
therefore different degrees of responsibility.290 For example, the
FTC could utilize financial sanctions that scale with the quantity of
followers, reserving the high-profile headlines proclaiming large
289 Compare Marianna Hewitt, Ask a Blogger: Exactly How Do Fashion
Bloggers Make Money?, HARPER’S BAZAAR (Aug. 18, 2015), https://
www.harpersbazaar.com/culture/features/a11902/how-do-fashion-bloggers-
make-money/ (listing different methods of becoming a professional fashion
blogger), and Sabrina Fenster, How to Choose A Fashion Affiliate Network,
SHELF (Aug. 25, 2019), https://www.theshelf.com/influencer-resources/how-to-
choose-a-fashion-affiliate-network (discussing affiliate link programs in greater
detail), with The Ultimate Guide to Becoming a Gaming Influencer on Livestream
Platforms, INFLUENCER MKTG. HUB, https://influencermarketinghub.com/how-
to-be-gaming-influencer/ (last updated May 14, 2020) (indicating that video game
influencers rely less upon affiliate link programs and rely more upon cultivation
of a brand and subsequent platform payment tools).
290 Max Willens, ‘A More Sophisticated Influencer Strategy’: Publishers are
Building Teams to Recruit ‘Expert Networks’, DIGIDAY (Apr. 12, 2019), https://
digiday.com/media/sophisticated-influencer-strategy-business-news-publishers-
accumulate-influential-audiences/ (indicating the increasing sophistication of
influencer strategies).
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fines for cases against well-known celebrities or other wealthy
influencers.291
This is mutually beneficial overall. Following these sanctions,
the advertising industry will proclaim its ability to self-regulate, and
adjudicative action is certain to generate some attention as well as
expand compliance with the rules. An action taken against a high-
profile influencer or public figure will also generate headlines
outside of the advertising world, spreading the message even
further.
While we recognize the FTC cannot fully police the entire realm
of social media, there are plenty of candidates among the 86% of
non-complying influencers for the FTC to choose from.292 While
some of the commenters called out for drastic action in the FTC’s
2020 endorsement guideline inquiry, in practical terms what we are
arguing is that what the agency needs to do is “set some
precedent.”293 The agency has already made the determination
291 Still, even scaled enforcements would recognize that influencers are often
highly sophisticated parties that should be expected to comply with the law. For
example, before the FTC enforced against Machinima, Machinima was a
behemoth of a channel and boasted over 12 million subscribers. Bill Flook,
Veenome’s Kevin Lenane on Twitch, Amazon and the Validation of User-
Generated Content, WASH. BUS. J. (Apr. 28, 2014), https://www.bizjournals.com
/washington/blog/techflash/2014/08/veenomes-kevin-lenane-on-twitch-amazon-
and-the.html; Julia Alexander,Machinima, One of YouTube’s Biggest and Oldest
Channels, Goes Dark, VERGE (Jan. 19, 2019), https://www.theverge.com/2019/1
/19/18189611/machinima-youtube-fullscreen-warner-bros-multi-channel-
network.
292 See INFLUENCER MKTG. HUB, supra note 19 (“We found only 14% of
posts to be fully compliant and meeting all regulatory guidelines as set out by the
FTC and CMA.”). Importantly, even the Influencer Marketing Hub report
recognized the possibility of FTC enforcement due to the high number of non-
complying influencer posts. See id. (“[T]here is a real danger that the FTC and
CMA will start prosecuting rather than just warning and educating.”).
Unsurprisingly, and likely in part because of the FTC’s failure to enforce its § 5(a)
authority, this compliance rate is only marginally higher than the previous year’s
11% compliance rate. Id.
293 While the authors are staunch First Amendment advocates who are
generally reluctant to make calls for subsequent punishment in the form of state
action, it bears mention that deceptive commercial speech is not granted the same
deference as other forms of speech under the First Amendment. See Va. Bd. of
Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 771–73 (1976).
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through its letters that nondisclosure in influencer speech is
deceptive. If the FTC wants to move past those determinations, the
opportunity to use some of the many examples of failed disclosures
provided by the commentators within the Endorsement Guides
review remains available.294
We also do not make this proposal absent a consideration of the
commenters who were opposed to additional regulation, many of
whom stated in their comments that they were seeking some
additional guidance on the rules.295 Adjudications will achieve this
result faster and certainly more effectively than an extended
rulemaking proceeding, to say nothing of the months that have
passed without formal agency action since the inquiry was closed.296
Nor do we propose enforcement against influencers as the sole
option.297 The FTC’s educational outreach to influencers should
continue, and the FTC should continue to pursue opportunities to
create compliance incentives outside of enforcement.298 However,
294 See generally Guides Concerning the Use of Endorsements and
Testimonials in Advertising, 85 Fed. Reg. 10104, 10105–07 (Feb. 21, 2020)
(offering numerous examples of failed disclosures and methods to curb these
abuses).
295 See, e.g., Maastricht Univ., supra note 271 (listing many likely issues that
discourage the FTC’s coaxing influencers to comply with the guides).
296 Guides Concerning the Use of Endorsements and Testimonials in
Advertising, 85 Fed. Reg. at 10104 (indicating the date of the rule and the length
of time passed since comments have been received).
297 Indeed, even comments on the FTC’s website indicate that the FTC is a
“great resource” for compliance information. See Lesley Fair, Endorsement
Guides: The FTC Wants Your Feedback, FED. TRADE COMM’N (Feb. 12, 2020),
https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/blogs/business-blog/2020/02/endorsement-
guides-ftc-wants-your-feedback. These authors do not think the FTC should un-
publish its guides, the Disclosure 101 documentation, or cease its social media
outreach events; they propose instead that these should bolster enforcement action
for violations by influencers.
298 Platforms defunding advertisements for non-compliant influencers has
become one trendy solution, but it is unlikely to succeed without sufficient
enforcement against select, non-compliant influencers by the FTC. See Andrew
Hutchinson, Instagram Announces New Crackdown on Influencers Who Fail to
Disclose Commercial Partnerships, SOCIALMEDIATODAY (Oct. 16, 2020),
https://www.socialmediatoday.com/news/instagram-announces-new-crackdown-
on-influencers-who-fail-to-disclose-comme/587229/ (discussing Instagram’s
history of attempts to curb influencer non-disclosure).
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sufficiently strong enforcement against influencers must be part of
the solution, regardless of the other prongs the FTC chooses to
undertake.
CONCLUSION
Historically, the FTC has used enforcement actions as a model
for other advertisers to follow, and to outline actions to avoid in
future advertising.299 The FTC’s lack of enforcement against
influencers has led to a status quo of non-compliance. After two
attempts at self-regulation, another set of advisory guidelines or
another informational video where an FTC staff attorney uses jump
cuts and outfit changes in a failed attempt to appear hip is not going
to generate compliance. Not ironically, the FTC’s passive approach
to influencers has turned it into the follower without influence.
Deceptive practices by social media influencers have become
normatively accepted while the FTC has dawdled on exercising the
same authority that it has widely used against endorsements in
advertising appearing in traditional media for decades. The FTC, if
it wishes to take the agency’s consumer protection mission
seriously, must step up and enforce deception in online advertising,
including that of influencers. As 2020 has come and gone, the FTC
has refused to take the issue on directly, offering guidelines rather
than engaging in adjudicative enforcement actions against serial
violators. If the FTC does not act, brands, advertising firms, and
influencers will continue to flaunt the law.300
299 See generally Karns, supra note 71, at 429–30 (detailing FTC’s use of
advertising enforcement actions and adjudication from the 1930s to the 1980s to
assert its advertising deception policy stances).
300 For example, the FTC has created blog posts that purport to solve this
issue, but a glance at the comments section indicates that nearly all commenters
disagree. Fair, supra note 246.
